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 Abstract
The gains from insurance arise from the transfer of income across states. Yet, by requir-
ing that the premium be paid upfront, standard insurance products also transfer income 
across time. We show that this intertemporal transfer can help explain low insurance 
demand, especially among the poor, and in a randomized control trial in Kenya we test 
a crop insurance product which removes it. The product is interlinked with a contract 
farming scheme: as with other inputs, the buyer of the crop offers the insurance and 
deducts the premium from farmer revenues at harvest time. The take-up rate is 72%, 
compared to 5% for the standard upfront contract, and take-up is highest among poorer 
farmers. Additional experiments and outcomes indicate that liquidity constraints, pres-
ent bias, and counterparty risk are all important constraints on the demand for standard 
insurance. Finally, evidence from a natural experiment in the United States, exploiting 
a change in the timing of the premium payment for Federal Crop Insurance, shows that 
the transfer across time also affects insurance adoption in developed countries. 
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I. Introduction
In the textbook model of insurance, income is transferred across states of the
world, from good states to bad. In practice, however, most insurance products
also transfer income across time: the premium is paid upfront with certainty,
and any payouts are made in the future, if a bad state occurs. As a result,
the demand for insurance depends not just on risk aversion, but also on several
additional factors, including liquidity constraints, intertemporal preferences, and
trust. Since these factors can also make it harder to smooth consumption over
time, and hence to self-insure, charging the premium upfront may reduce demand
for insurance precisely when the potential gains are largest, for example among
the poor.1
This paper provides experimental evidence on the consequences of the transfer
across time in insurance, by evaluating a crop insurance product which eliminates
it. Crop insurance offers large potential welfare gains in developing countries, as
farmers face risky incomes and have little savings to self-insure. Yet demand for
crop insurance has remained persistently low, in spite of heavy subsidies, product
innovation, and marketing campaigns (Cole et al. 2013). The transfer across
time is a potential explanation. Farmers face highly cyclical incomes which they
struggle to smooth across time, and insurance makes doing so harder: premiums
are due at planting, when farmers are investing, while any payouts are made at
harvest, when farmers receive their yields.2
The insurance product we study eliminates the transfer across time by charg-
ing the premium at harvest, rather than upfront. We work in partnership with
a Kenyan contract farming company, one of the largest agri-businesses in East
Africa, which contracts around 80,000 small-holder farmers to grow sugarcane.
As is standard in contract farming, the company provides inputs to the farmers
on credit, deducting the costs from farmers’ revenues at harvest time. We tie
an insurance contract to the production contract and use the same mechanism
to enforce premium payment: the company offers the insurance product,3 and
deducts the premium (plus interest) at harvest.
Our first experiment shows that delaying the premium payment until harvest
time results in a large increase in insurance demand. In the experiment we offered
insurance to 605 of the farmers contracting with the company and randomized
the timing of the premium payment.4 Take-up of the standard, upfront insurance
1For an example of the textbook model of insurance, see example 6.C.1 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
Such purely cross-state insurance contracts do exist – examples include futures contracts and social
security.
2Further, while farmers can often reduce their idiosyncratic income risk through informal risk sharing
(Townsend 1994), similar mechanisms are less effective for reducing seasonal variation in income, since
it is aggregate.
3The insurance product has a double-trigger design (Elabed et al. 2013), providing partial yield
insurance, conditional on both plot yield and local area yield being below given thresholds, and on
harvesting with the company.
4The experiment was registered before baseline at the AEA RCT registry, ID AEARCTR-0000486,
https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/486
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2was 5%: low, but not out of line with results for other “actuarially-fair” insurance
products in similar settings.9 In contrast, when the premium was due at harvest
(including interest at 1% per month, the rate which the company charges on loans
for inputs), take-up was 72%, among the highest take-up rates seen for agricultural
insurance in similar settings. To benchmark this difference, in a third treatment
arm we offered a 30% price discount on the upfront insurance premium. Take-up
among this third group was 6%, not significantly different from take-up under
the full-price upfront premium. Taken together, these results show that farmers
do have high demand for insurance, but they have a low willingness to pay for it
upfront.
To help to identify the channels, we develop an intertemporal model of insur-
ance demand, which shows that the transfer across time in insurance can help to
explain why the poor demand so little of it. The model is based on a buffer-stock
saving model (Deaton 1991) and includes a borrowing constraint, present-biased
preferences, and imperfect contract enforcement. Liquidity constraints are cen-
tral and play a dual role. First, they make paying the premium upfront more
costly (if the borrowing constraint may bind, or almost bind, before harvest).
Second, they make self-insurance through consumption smoothing harder, and
thus increase the gains from risk reduction. As such, the transfer across time
in insurance reduces demand precisely when the potential gains from insurance
are largest. In the model, as in the real world, the poor are more susceptible to
liquidity constraints and thus have both higher demand for pay-at-harvest insur-
ance and a larger drop in demand when having to pay upfront. Heterogeneous
treatment effects show that both predictions hold in the main experiment, for the
poor and for the liquidity constrained.
Two additional experiments provide further evidence on channels. In the first,
we dig deeper into the role of liquidity constraints. Not having cash was the most
common reason given by farmers who did not buy pay-upfront insurance in the
main experiment. To test this, in this experiment we gave a subset of farmers
cash, before offering them insurance later in the same meeting (similar to Cole
et al. 2013). The cash gift, being slightly larger than the cost of the premium,
ensured that farmers did have liquidity to purchase the insurance if they wished
to. However, as acknowledged by Cole et al. (2013), it may also have induced
reciprocity. To address this, we cross-cut the cash treatment with a pay-upfront
vs pay-at-harvest treatment. The difference-in-differences effect of the cash was
8%, small and not significant, showing that pay-upfront insurance was not the
marginal expenditure, and ruling out the explanation that farmers simply did
not have cash.5 However, because the cash gift may not have completely removed
liquidity constraints (farmers may still have wanted to borrow), two possible
explanations remain: farmers were not liquidity constrained to begin with, or
5Barring reciprocity, if anything we would expect demand for pay-at-harvest insurance to fall slightly
with a cash drop, hence the diff-in-diffs should be an upper bound on the effect on upfront take-up, net
of reciprocity.
3farmers were very liquidity constrained and hence had other uses for cash. The
next experiment helps separate the two: it should only find an effect in the latter
case.
In the second experiment on channels, we consider the effect of a small delay
in the premium payment, such that payment is not due immediately at sign-up.6
The design targets present bias, which has important implications for optimal
contract design and for welfare interpretations. In the experiment, we compare
insurance take-up across two groups. In both groups, during the visit, farmers
had to choose between a cash payment, equal to the insurance premium, and
free enrollment in the insurance. Farmers in the first group were told they would
receive their choice immediately, whereas farmers in the second group were told
they would receive their choice in one month’s time.7 Delaying delivery this way,
by just one month, increased insurance take-up by 21 percentage points. We show
that the size of this effect is inconsistent with standard exponential discounting -
if the discount rate was high, then why buy insurance in one month? In contrast,
it is consistent with present bias (combined with liquidity constraints).
The final channel we consider is imperfect contract enforcement. If either party
defaults before harvest time, then the farmer does not pay the premium at harvest,
whereas the upfront premium is sunk. Tying the contracts together means that,
for the farmer, defaulting on the insurance requires side-selling (selling to other
buyers), and vice versa.8 This has two implications. First, it reduces strategic
default on the harvest-time premium, the natural concern with removing the
transfer across time, since farmers typically value the production relationship. In
keeping with this, there was no significant difference in side-selling, or in yield
conditional on not side-selling, across pay-upfront and pay-at-harvest treatment
groups. Second, however, it can induce default: if the farmer side-sells for other
reasons, he automatically defaults on the insurance contract. In our setting,
before harvest, the company faced severe financial difficulties and temporarily
shut-down their factory, resulting in long delays and uncertainty in harvesting.
Because of this, twelve months after our experiment began, there was widespread
side-selling: 52% of farmers side-sold or uprooted, compared to a historical rate
of less than 10%.
In spite of the large default rates ex-post, three arguments suggest that, ex-
ante, any differential effect on take-up by the timing of the premium was limited.
First, using our model, we bound the differential effect on take-up by the effect
of a price cut on take-up for upfront insurance. In particular, a percentage price
cut, of size given by the expected probability of side-selling, times the relative
(expected) marginal utility of consumption conditional on side-selling, has a larger
6Such delays have been shown to increase savings in other settings, such as Save More Tomorrow
programs (Thaler and Benartzi 2004).
7Giving farmers the choice between the premium and insurance for free, rather than the choice of
whether to buy insurance, eased liquidity constraints and enabled us to enforce payment in the one
month treatment.
8If the farmer side-sells neither at-harvest premium payments, nor payouts, occur.
4effect. But the main experiment showed that demand for upfront insurance is
inelastic, so for this channel to be important one of these two terms would have
had to be very large. Second, while survey measures of trust in the company are
correlated with overall insurance take-up, their interactions with the timing of the
premium are not, suggesting that concerns of the company defaulting on insurance
payouts after harvesting were more prevalent than expectations of side-selling.
Third, assuming ex-ante expectations of side-selling are predictive of actual side-
selling, then the correlation between take-up and actual side-selling should vary
by premium timing. For both individual and local average side-selling, in the
data it does not.
In the final contribution of the paper, we present evidence of external validity
from a natural experiment in the United States. In developed countries, better
legal institutions may make the enforcement of cross-state insurance easier, but
better functioning financial markets may also make the transfer across time matter
less. We provide evidence that the transfer across time does still matter, using
a policy reform in the Federal Crop Insurance program, one of the largest in
the world. Historically, premiums for the FCI typically were due around harvest
time. But, starting in 2012, the premium due date was moved earlier for certain
crops, requiring agricultural producers to pay premiums from operating funds.
Identifying off of variation across time, crops, states, and county characteristics,
we show that the change reduced the amount of insurance purchased, and that, in
line with the role of liquidity constraints, the effect was concentrated in counties
with smaller farms.
This paper adds to several strands of literature. First, many papers have in-
vestigated the demand for agricultural insurance and the factors which constrain
it (Cole et al. 2013; Karlan et al. 2014). Demand is generally found to be low,
and interventions to increase it typically have small effects in percentage-point
terms.9 Many of the proposed explanations, such as risk preferences and basis
risk (Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012; Elabed et al. 2013; Clarke 2016), relate to
the transfer across states in insurance; we focus on the transfer across time.10
Several studies have bundled insurance with credit (Gine and Yang 2009; Carter,
Cheng and Sarris 2011; Karlan et al. 2014; Banerjee, Duflo and Hornbeck 2014),
finding that take-up of credit increases little, and in some cases decreases. We
effectively do the reverse, bundling credit with insurance. The closest paper to
ours, Liu et al. (2016), finds that, for a livestock mortality insurance provided by
the government in China, delaying premium payment increases take-up from 5%
9 Karlan et al. (2014) find the highest take-up rates at actuarially fair prices among these studies,
at around 40%; but most find significantly lower rates, for example, at around 50% of actuarially fair
prices, Cole et al. (2013) find 20-30% take-up, and at commercial price Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012)
find 15% take-up.
10The intertemporal transfer in insurance means that a long line of work on investment decisions and
financial market imperfections in developing country settings is also relevant (Rosenzweig and Wolpin
1993, Conning and Udry 2007). In particular, we add to evidence of the importance of liquidity constraints
(Cohen and Dupas 2010) and present bias (Duflo, Kremer and Robinson 2011) in similar settings.
5to 16%; Liu and Myers (2016) considers the theoretical implications.11 As far as
we know, our paper is the first to provide experimental evidence on the effect of
completely removing the intertemporal transfer from insurance contracts, and on
the role of liquidity constraints, present bias and other channels.12
Second, the transfer across time in insurance is studied implicitly in finance,
but the focus is on how insurance companies benefit by investing the premiums
(Becker and Ivashina 2015), rather than on the cost for consumers, our focus.
A recent exception is a largely theoretical literature (Rampini and Viswanathan
2010, 2013; Rampini, Sufi and Viswanathan 2014) which argues that firms face
a trade-off between financing and insurance. Rampini and Viswanathan (2016)
apply similar reasoning to households.13 These papers are part of a wide literature
on how imperfect enforcement affects the set of financial contracts which exists
(Bulow and Rogoff 1989; Ligon, Thomas and Worrall 2002), to which we add by
considering the implications of imperfect enforcement for the timing of insurance
premiums.
Finally, our paper adds to a literature on the importance of interlinked con-
tracts, i.e. contracts covering multiple markets, in developing country settings.14
In particular, our work relates to a body of research that documents the presence
of informal insurance agreements in output and credit market contracts (Udry
1994; Minten, Vandeplas and Swinnen 2011), and to a recent line of empirical
research on the emergence and impact of interlinked transactions (Casaburi and
Macchiavello 2016; Casaburi and Reed 2014; Ghani and Reed 2014; Macchiavello
and Morjaria 2014, 2015).15
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
setting in which the experiment took place and how tying an insurance contract
to a production contract affects enforcement. Section III presents the main ex-
perimental design and results. Section IV develops an intertemporal model of
insurance demand. Section V presents evidence on channels, from the main ex-
periment and from two additional experiments. Section VI presents evidence
of external validity from a natural experiment in the U.S. Finally, section VII
discusses the policy relevance of the results, presents ideas for future work, and
concludes.
11They argue that charging the premium later may help address trust and liquidity constraints.
12We add three further contributions relative to existing papers. First, we work in a setting where
contract enforcement is challenging, and consider a novel way to potentially improve it: tying the in-
surance contract to a production contract. This is important, since it is exactly in such settings where
credit markets are likely to be inefficient, and hence paying the premium upfront will be costly. Second,
we work with crop insurance, where seasonality increases the importance of the transfer across time.
Third, we show, theoretically and empirically, that the transfer across time is most costly for the poor,
providing a potential explanation for their low insurance demand.
13They show that limited liability results in poorer households facing greater income risk in equilibrium,
even when a full set of state-contingent assets is available.
14See Bardhan (1980), Bardhan (1989), and Bell (1988) for summaries of this literature.
15In particular, Casaburi and Macchiavello (2016) discuss how reputation allows large firms to credibly
provide interlinked services to their suppliers. While they focus on the interlinked provision of saving
services, some of the arguments apply to insurance products too.
6II. Setting, contract farming, and interlinked insurance
We work in partnership with a contract farming company in Western Kenya,
one of the largest agri-businesses in East Africa. The company, founded in 1971,
operates a large sugar factory which needs a steady supply of sugarcane. To
supply the factory, the company contracts around 80,000 small-holder farmers to
grow sugarcane. We offer insurance to some of these farmers. The setting is ideal
for studying the intertemporal transfer in insurance because, as we explain below,
contract farming offers a way to charge the premium at harvest time. Several other
aspects also make it a good setting for developing and evaluating an insurance
product: a large number of farmers, a long panel of data on production and plot
characteristics, and important production risks.
Sugarcane, the crop which we insure in the study, is the main cash crop in the
region. It accounts for more than a quarter of the total income for 80% of farmers
in our sample, and more than one half of total income for 38% of farmers. It is
not seasonal (in the region) and, once planted, lasts upwards of three growing
cycles. Growing cycles are long - each one lasts around sixteen months - which
means that the difference between paying the insurance premium upfront or at
harvest time is particularly stark. The first cycle, called the plant cycle, involves
higher input costs and hence lower profits than the subsequent cycles, called the
ratoon cycles, and yields decline over cycles. Crop failure is rare, but yields are
subject to significant risks from rainfall, climate, pests and cane fire.
Farmers who grow sugarcane are typically poor, but not the poorest in the
region. In our sample, 80% of farmers own at least one cow, the average total
area of cultivated land is 2.9 acres, and the average sugarcane plot size is 0.8 acres.
Very few farmers in the study area have had experience with formal insurance.16
A. Contract farming
Contract farming involves the signing of a production contract between farmers
and buyers, at planting, which both guarantees the farmer a market and binds
them to sell to the company, at harvest. It is a production form of increasing
prevalence (UNCTAD 2009), and our setting is typical. Farmers, termed out-
growers, enter in to a contract with the firm at planting time, with the contract
covering the life of the cane seed, meaning multiple harvests over at least four
years. The harvesting is done by company contractors, who subsequently trans-
port the cane to the company factory where it is weighed. Farmers are paid at
each harvest, by weight, at a price set by the Kenyan Sugar Board, the regulatory
body of the national sugar industry.17
Interlinked credit A major benefit of contract farming is that the company
can supply productive inputs to farmers on credit, and then recover these input
16Those farmers that do have experience of insurance have mostly had health or funeral insurance.
17Refined sugar is subject to import tariffs and quotas in Kenya.
7loans through deductions from harvest revenues. Such practice, often referred to
as interlinking credit and production markets,18 is widespread and our setting is
no exception: the company provides inputs such as land preparation, seedcane,
fertilizer, and harvesting services, with the costs (plus interest, at 1% per month)19
deducted from harvest revenues.20
Contract enforcement The company must rely on self-enforcement of the
contract, and thus the repayment of the input loan. This is because, as is common
in developing countries, the cost of direct enforcement with a small farmer is
prohibitively high. So, while illegal, farmers may side-sell (i.e. break the contract
by selling to another sugarcane company) with little risk of prosecution. By
side-selling, farmers avoid repaying the input loan,21 and are paid immediately
upon harvesting, but they are typically paid a significantly lower price for their
cane. While the company cannot directly penalize farmers for side-selling, the
company will collect any dues owed to it (plus interest) if possible, either from
the same plot if it is re-contracted in the future, or from other plots of the farmer
if he contracts multiple plots.22 Since sugarcane is a bulky crop, the cost of
transporting the cane to other sugar factories is often prohibitively high, and so
side-selling is generally less of a concern than for more easily transported crops.
Both the high transportation cost and monitoring by company outreach workers
(discussed below) make partial side-selling unlikely.
We do not have direct information on the historical levels of side-selling in our
context, but the administrative data we do have allows us to bound it. Prior to
our experiment, in 2010-12, an average of 12% of plots which harvested in ratoon
1 did not harvest in ratoon 2, and figure 5 shows how this varied geographically.
This is an upper bound on side-selling during this time, since some of these cases
will be where farmers uproot the crop immediately after the ratoon 1 harvest
(for example because of crop disease or poor yields). Since side-selling is illegal,
obtaining detailed information from farmers about its causes and consequence is
difficult.
The company is unlikely to strategically default on the contract. The main
responsibility for the company under the contract is to purchase the farmer’s
18Interlinkages, where a single contract or transaction between agents spans different markets, are an
important feature of many agricultural markets in developing countries (Bardhan 1980; Bell 1988; IFAD
2003)
19Inflation in Kenya was around 6% per annum during the study, so the real interest rate on input
loans from the company was 7% per annum.
20In addition to the risks mentioned above, company delays in these input provisions are a further
source of risk for farmers.
21Macchiavello and Morjaria (2014) show that, in the context of coffee in Rwanda, higher competition
reduces input loans potentially for this reason.
22Any debt owed on a plot remains on the plot even if it is sold, and the debt is collected from future
revenues even if the plot is subsequently farmed by another farmer. At the time we ran our experiment,
debt collection remained at the plot level: if a farmer defaulted on a loan on one plot, the company
would not recover that loan from revenues from other plots farmed by the farmer. However the company
changed this policy before harvest time for our farmers, so that defaulted loans on one plot could be
recovered from other plots of the same farmer.
8cane at the price set by the Kenyan Sugar Board. Failure to do so would likely
be reported to the Board, with consequences for the company, as farmers are
well represented politically in the region. Farmers are, however, vulnerable to
non-strategic default. If the company were to become insolvent, it would be
unable to honor its agreement to purchase the cane, in which case farmers would
be forced sell to another buyer. This happened, temporarily, 12 months after
the start of our experiment, affecting some of the farmers in our sample. In
Section V.D we discuss in detail the implications for the interpretation of our
results - to summarize that discussion, multiple tests find no evidence that ex-
ante anticipation of the shock affected our main results and we bound the size of
the role it could have played.
Administration The company has to coordinate with its 80,000 farmers; how
it does so has two implications for our study. First, the company employs out-
reach workers to visit farmers in their homes and to monitor plots. These outreach
workers market the insurance product we introduce, as detailed in the next sec-
tion. Second, because of fixed costs in input provision, the outreach workers
must group neighboring plots into administrative units called fields, which can
be provided inputs and harvested concurrently. As detailed in Section III, in our
experiments we stratify treatment assignment at the field level. In our study
sample, fields contain on average 8.7 plots.
B. Interlinked insurance
In standard insurance contracts the farmer pays upfront, so all of the contract
risk is placed on the farmer.23 Charging the premium at harvest time reduces
the risk faced by the farmer: if the insurance company defaults before harvest
time, at least the farmer will not have to pay the premium. However, it places
significant counterparty risk on the insurer, the risk that the farmer does not
pay the premium when harvests are good. In contract farming settings, future
premium payments can be better enforced using the same mechanism which is
already used to enforce repayment of input loans. Namely, the buyer can provide
the insurance, and charge the premium as a deduction from harvest revenues.
Tying together the insurance and production contracts in this way, which we
refer to as interlinking, increases the cost to the farmer of defaulting on the pre-
mium payment. In an interlinked contract, the only way default on the premium
payment is to also default on the production contract, by selling to another buyer.
As such, default compromises not only access to insurance in future periods, but
also to all the other gains from the interaction with the buying company, including
the current and future purchase guarantees as well as future input provision.24,25
23Consistent with this, trust has been shown to be an important issue in shaping insurance take-up
in other settings (Dercon, Gunning and Zeitlin 2011, Cole et al. 2013, Liu et al. 2016).
24The same argument is often cited as an important advantage of interlinking credit markets and
product markets.
25Interlinking also has the additional benefit of the insurance being offered by a firm that the farmer
9However, interlinking the insurance also has a potential cost in terms of en-
forcement. Namely, counterparty risk in the farming contract spills over into the
insurance contract.26 If a farmer decides to side-sell for reasons unrelated to the
insurance contract, doing so mechanically triggers default on the insurance con-
tract. While, under certain conditions, this need not affect the functioning of the
insurance market (for example, if default on the product contract is orthogonal
to potential insurance payouts), it does limit the states of the world than can be
covered by an interlinked insurance product.
Another concern with interlinking insurance with contract farming is it increases
side-selling relative to that which would occur without insurance. However, there
are two reasons to believe that this effect will be minimal in our setting. First,
the value of the insurance premium is likely to be much smaller than pre-existing
input loans, such as seeds and fertilizer. As argued above, the choice of strategic
default depends on the comparison between the static benefits of the default
and the continuation value of the relationship; the insurance premium is unlikely
to be marginal in this decision.27 Second, given the insurance design (detailed
in the next section), the farmer has limited information about whether he will
receive the insurance payout at the time when he has to decide whether to sell
to the company. In keeping with this, Section V.D shows indeed that interlinked
insurance did not increase side-selling.
Finally, we note that in contract farming settings, since many of the inputs are
provided by the company, there is less scope for insurance to impact productivity
than in many other settings. The only inputs required from the farmer are the
use of their land, plus labor for planting, weeding, and protecting the crop. This
means that insurance is less likely to induce moral hazard, which would lower pro-
ductivity, but also that insurance may be less likely to enable risky investments,
which would increase productivity.
III. Does the transfer across time affect insurance demand?
This section describes the main experiment of the paper, in which we compare
take-up for insurance when the premium is paid upfront to take-up when the
premium is paid at harvest time, thus removing the intertemporal transfer. Doing
so has a large effect: in our setting, charging the premium as a deduction from
harvest revenues, rather than upfront, increases take-up by 67 percentage points.
A. Experimental design
Treatment groups The experimental design randomized 605 farmers across
three treatment groups. In all three treatments the farmers were offered the same
is familiar with, which may help with trust.
26The same cost exists arises from interlinking credit and product markets.
27Further, if the farmers value access to insurance in future years, offering it would increase the
continuation value of the relationship with the buyer, and hence insurance provision could actually
reduce the occurrence of side-selling.
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insurance product, described below. The only thing that we varied across groups
was the premium payment. In the first group (U1), farmers were offered the in-
surance product and had to pay the premium upfront. The premium was charged
at “full price”, which across the study spanned between 85% and 100% of the
actuarially fair price. In the second group (U2), payment was again required
upfront, but farmers received a 30% discount relative to the full price. Finally,
in the third group (H), farmers could subscribe for the insurance and have the
premium (full-price) deducted from their revenues at harvest time, including in-
terest charged at the same rate used for the inputs the company supplies on credit
(1% per month).28 Randomization across these treatment groups occurred at the
farmer level and was stratified by field.
Insurance design The insurance was offered by the company and the terms
of the payout of the insurance were the same across the different experimental
treatments. There was no intensive margin of insurance and farmers could only
subscribe for the entire plot, not for parts of it. The insurance product offered was
a double-trigger area yield insurance, preferred to a standard rainfall insurance
product because risk factors other than rainfall affect yields.29 Under the double-
trigger design, a farmer receives a payout if two conditions are met: first, their
plot yield has to be below 90% of its predicted level; second, average yield in
their field must be below 90% of its predicted level. The design borrows from
other studies that have used similar double trigger products in different settings
(Elabed et al. 2013), and relied on rich administrative panel data at the plot level
which helped with the design and pricing of the insurance in numerous ways.30
The product is very much a partial insurance product: in the states where payouts
are triggered, it covers half of the plot losses below the 90% trigger, up to a cap of
20% of the predicted production revenues. Finally, farmers only receive insurance
payouts if they sell their cane to the company, as agreed under the production
contract.
Insurance marketing The insurance was offered by company outreach officers
during visits to the farmers. To reduce the risk of selecting farmers by their
interest in insurance, the specific purpose of the visits was not announced in
advance. 938 farmers were targeted, 639 (68%) of whom attended. The primary
28For this group, the expected interest was added to the initial premium when marketing the insurance
product.
29The company collects rainfall information through stations scattered across the company catchment
area. However, data quality issue is a concern and the predictive power of this rainfall data is low.
30The data included information on production levels, plot size, plot location, and crop cycle, and
was available for a subsample of plots for the period 1985-2006 and for the entire company catchment
area from 2008 onwards. The data was used to compute the predicted yields at the plot and area level
which were needed for the double trigger insurance design. The historical data also made it possible to
run simulations of alternative prediction models, and to compare the predictive power and costing of
alternative insurance products. The simulations verify that the double trigger product performs well in
terms of basis risk (A.1) - the proportion of farmers who receive a payout when the second area-level
trigger is added is about 74% of those who would receive it with a single-trigger insurance. Additional
calculations suggest the product does much better than an alternative product based on rainfall indexes.
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reason (75%) for non-attendance was that the farmers were busy somewhere far
away from the meeting location.
To ensure that our sample consisted of farmers who were able to understand
the insurance product, in an initial meeting outreach officers checked that the
target farmers mastered very basic related concepts (e.g. the concept of tonnage
and of acre). A small number of farmers (5%), typically elderly people, were
deemed non-eligible at this stage. The final sample for the randomization was
605 farmers. Comparing to the 333 who did not enter the sample, these farmers
had slightly larger plots (0.81 vs. 0.75 acres; p-value=0.015) and similar yields
(55.5 vs. 54.5 tons per hectare; p-value=0.41).
After the initial group meeting, the outreach officers described the product in
detail in one-to-one meetings with each farmer. They provided plot-specific visual
aids concerning insurance triggers and payout scenarios. In order to ensure that
the target farmers correctly understood the insurance product, outreach officers
verified that farmers could correctly answer basic questions about the product
before it was offered to them, e.g. the scenarios under which it would pay out. If
farmers could not answer these questions, outreach officers re-explained. Farmers
then had three to five business days to subscribe, with premiums collected either
immediately or during revisits at the end of this period.31
Sample selection Numerous farmer and plot criteria were used to select the
sample, both to increase power and to improve the functioning of the insurance.32
The experiment targeted plots in the early stages of the ratoon cycles (in par-
ticular the first and second ratoons), i.e. plots which have already harvested at
least once. This choice was made because the yield prediction model performs
better for ratoon than for plant cycles.33 In addition, input costs are lower in the
ratoon cycles, leading to fewer deductions from harvest revenues, and thus less
incentives for side-selling.
Data collection We combine two sources of data for the analysis: survey data
and administrative data. Our survey data comes from a short baseline survey,
31In practice, for a substantial share of these farmers, revisits occurred between one and two weeks
after the first visit.
32The criteria used to select the sample were: plot size - large plots were removed from the sample, to
minimize financial exposure from the insurance pilot; plot yields - outliers were excluded, to improve the
fit of the predicted yield in the insurance contract; the number of plots in the field - the study targeted
only fields with at least five plots, to improve power given the stratified design. the number of plots per
farmer - within each field, the few farmers with multiple plots were eligible to receive insurance in only
one of those, the smallest one, the number of farmers per plot - plots owned by groups of farmers were
excluded from the sample; finally, while contracted farmers are usually subsistence farmers, some plots
are owned by “telephone farmers” who live far from the plots and manage them remotely - such plots
are excluded from our sample.
33The model performs better for ratoon cycles because previous yields within the same contract, which
are available only for ratoon cycles, are a much better predictor of current yields than yields of harvests
in a previous contract
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carried out by our survey team during the outreach-worker visits described.34,35
As mentioned in section II, the company keeps administrative data on all of the
farmers in the scheme. From the administrative data we get information on
previous yields, plot size, and time since last harvest. The data also enables us
to track whether or not the farmer sells cane to the company at the end of the
cycle, and their yield conditional on doing so.
B. Balance
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the three treatment groups using
both administrative data and survey data, and shows that the experiment was
balanced across most covariates. Since stratification occurred at the field level, we
report p-values capturing the differences across the groups that are obtained from
regressions that include field fixed effects.36 Consistent with the specification we
use for some of our analysis, and our pre-analysis plan, we also report p-values
when bundling pay-upfront treatments U1 and U2 and comparing them to pay-at-
harvest treatment H. The table suggests that the randomization mostly achieved
balance across the observed covariates. In particular, only age is significantly
different when comparing the bundled upfront group U to H. We confirm below
that the experiment results are robust to the inclusion of baseline controls.
C. Experimental results
Our main outcome of interest is insurance take-up. Take-up rates have been
consistently low across a wide range of geographical settings and insurance designs
(Cole et al. 2013, Elabed et al. 2013, Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012). Yet gains
from insurance could be large, both directly and indirectly - farmers are subject
to substantial income risk from which they are unable to shield consumption,
and previous studies suggest that when farmers are offered agricultural insurance
they increase their investment levels (Karlan et al. 2014, Cole, Gine and Vickery
2013). The central hypothesis tested in this paper is that low take-up is in part
be due to the intertemporal transfer in insurance, which differentiates standard
insurance products from their purely intratemporal ideal.
The regression model we use compares the binary indicator for insurance take-
up – Tif , defined for farmer i in field f – across the three treatment groups,
controlling for field fixed effects:
(1) Tif = α+ βDiscounti + γDeductioni + ηf + if
34The survey was undertaken before randomization and the offering of the insurance product, with
the exception of a question on why the farmer chose to take up / not take up insurance, which was asked
after.
35We also use a second source of survey data. Several months later we followed up with a subset of
the farmers by phone, to check whether they remembered the terms of the insurance and whether they
regretted their take-up decision, as discussed below.
36This also implies that characteristics that do not vary within field, such as location, specific ratoon
cycle and average field yield are essentially perfectly balanced across treatment groups.
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Figure 2 summarizes the take-up rates across the three treatment groups. For
groups U2 and H, it also includes 95% confidence intervals of the difference in
take-up from U1, obtained from a regression of take-up on treatment dummies.
The first result is that take-up of the full-price, upfront premium is low, at 5%.
While low, this finding is consistent with several of the existing crop insurance
studies mentioned above. The low take-up shows that reducing basis risk (the
risk that the insurance will not pay out when farmers have a bad yield – one of
the proposed explanations for low demand for rainfall insurance) by using an area
yield double-trigger design is not enough to raise adoption, suggesting that the
availability of rich plot-level data, one of the main advantages a large firm may
bring to insurance, may not be sufficient to generate high demand for insurance.
The second result (the main result of the paper) is that delaying the premium
payment until harvest, thus removing the transfer across time, has a large effect
on take-up. Take-up of the pay-at-harvest, interlinked insurance contract (H) is
72%, a 67 percentage point increase from the baseline, upfront (U1) level, and one
of the highest take-up rates observed for actuarially fair crop insurance. Since the
only difference from the upfront treatment group is the timing of the payment
premium, the results show that in our setting farmers do want risk reduction,
they just do not want to pay for it upfront.
The third result, which allows us to benchmark the importance of the second,
is that offering a 30% price discount to the upfront premium has no statistically
significant impact on take-up rates. The point estimate for the effect is 1 percent-
age point, and even when considering the upper bound of the confidence interval,
take-up only increases by 8 percentage points. While this upper bound is consis-
tent with substantial demand price elasticity (given the low baseline take-up) it
suggests that medium-sized subsidies have limited scope to prompt large increases
in demand in absolute terms in this setting. In subsection V.D we use this result
to quantifying the possible importance of imperfect contract enforcement for our
results.
Table 2 presents regression analysis of these treatment effects, and shows that
they remain stable across a variety of specifications. Column (1) reports the
coefficient from the simple regression used to generate the histogram in Figure
2. As mentioned above, the pay-at-harvest product (H) has 67 percentage points
higher take-up relative to the “full-price” pay-upfront product (U1), which is
significant at the 1% level, whereas the 30% price cut product (U2) has just 1
percentage point higher take-up, which is far from significant. The difference
between the pay-at-harvest (H) and the reduced price pay-upfront (U2) products
is also significant at the 1% level. Column (2) adds fixed effects at the field level,
the stratification unit. The results are virtually unchanged. Column (3) pools
the upfront treatments U1 and U2, consistent with the specification we use later
in the heterogeneity analysis. Columns (4) and (5) further add controls for plot
and farmer characteristics, respectively. Finally, Column (6) includes both types
of controls.
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Farmer understanding One key question for the interpretation of the high
take-up rate is whether farmers understood what they were signing up for. We
believe that they did for two reasons. The first reason is, as mentioned above,
farmers were asked questions to test their understanding of the product before it
was offered to them. The second reason is, several months after the recruitment,
we called back 76 farmers who had signed up for the pay-at-harvest insurance. We
did so in two waves. In the first wave of 40 farmers, we began by reminding the
farmers of the terms of the insurance product (the deductible premium and the
double trigger design) and then checked that the terms were what the farmers had
understood when originally visited. All farmers said they were. We then asked
the farmers if they would sign up again for the product if offered next season.
32 (80%) said they would while 3 (7.5%) said they would not. The remaining
5 (12.5%) stated that their choice would depend on the outcome of the current
cycle. In the second wave of 36 farmers, we did not prompt the farmers about the
insurance terms, but instead asked farmers to explain them to us. 25 (69%) were
able to do so. Of this second wave of farmers, after reminding those who had
forgotten the terms, 28 (85%) said they would sign up for the product if offered
next season.
To summarize, the results in this section show that pay-at-harvest insurance,
enabled by interlinking product and insurance markets, has high take-up at actu-
arially fair price levels, while its standard, pay-upfront equivalent has low take-up
(even with a substantial price cut), consistent with experience in other settings.
IV. An intertemporal model of insurance demand
In this section we develop a model which captures both the cross-state and
cross-time transfers in insurance. To do so the model must be dynamic, so we
begin by setting up a background intertemporal model, without insurance, into
which we then introduce an insurance product. We first consider the case when
the insurance contract is perfectly enforceable, and then we allow for imper-
fect enforcement. The model shows how the different channels interact to affect
insurance demand (and for whom) and motivates subsequent experiments and
empirical tests to identify them. Proofs and derivations are in the appendix.
A. Background
The background model is a buffer-stock savings model, as in Deaton (1991),
with the addition of present-biased preferences and cyclical income flows (repre-
senting agricultural seasonality).
Time and state We use a discrete-time, infinite horizon model. Each period t,
which we will typically think of as one month, has a set of states corresponding to
different income realizations. The probability distribution over states is assumed
to be memoryless and cyclical, representing, for example, cyclical agricultural
incomes.
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Utility Individuals have time-separable preferences37 and maximize present-
biased expected utility u(ct)+βΣ
∞
i=1δ
iE[u(ct+i)] as in Laibson (1997). We assume
that u(.) satisfies u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, limc→0u′(c) =∞ and u′′′ > 0.38 We also assume
that β ∈ (0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1).
Intertemporal transfers Households have access to a risk-free asset with con-
stant rate of return R and are subject to a borrowing constraint.39 As in Deaton
(1991), we assume Rδ < 1.
Income and wealth Households have state-dependent income in each period
yt. We assume yt > 0 ∀t ∈ R+.40 We denote wealth at the beginning of each
period by wt, and cash-on-hand once income is received by xt = wt + yt.
Household’s problem The household faces the following maximization se-
quence problem in period t:
(2) max
(ct+i)i≥0
u(ct) + βE[Σ∞i=1δiu(ct+i)]
subject to, for all i ≥ 0,
xt+i+1 = R(xt+i − ct+i) + yt+i+1
xt+i − ct+i ≥ 0
Denote the value function of the household by Vt. Since income is memoryless,
Vt is a function of just one state variable, cash-on-hand xt. Since preferences are
not time-consistent, Vt is different from the continuation value function, denoted
V ct , which is the value function at time t, given time t − 1 self’s intertemporal
preferences, i.e. without present bias. We assume that households are naive-
βδ discounters, in that they believe that they will be exponential discounters in
future periods (and thus may have incorrect beliefs about future consumption
functions). There is evidence for such naivete in other settings (DellaVigna and
Malmendier 2006), and with the exception of Proposition 2, the comparative
statics with respect to wealth, all of the propositions below follow through with
slight modification in the sophisticated-βδ case.41
37We note that time-separable preferences equate the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ψ, and
the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, 1
γ
. As such they imply a tight link between
preferences towards risk and towards consumption smoothing, both of which are relevant for the demand
for upfront insurance. Recursive preferences would enable us to untangle the two (Epstein and Zin 1989),
which would provide an additional interpretation for our results. Namely, if ψ  1
γ
, then we may expect
a large gap between the demand for upfront and deductible insurance, since the cost of variation in
consumption over time would greatly exceed that of variation in consumption across state.
38We assume prudence, i.e. u′′′ > 0, as is common in the precautionary savings literature (and as
holds for CRRA utility), to ensure that the value of risk reduction is decreasing in wealth, i.e. Lemma
1, part 3. Prudence and liquidity constraints interact, strengthening the result, but our proof requires
prudence to ensure the result holds with strict inequality.
39The results are identical if instead there is a borrowing limit a, so that xt − ct ≥ a ∀t. Also, the
model may be extended to assume a private investment technology F (k), or similarly a wealth-dependent
interest rate. Then the individual is liquidity constrained at time t iff F ′(kt) > R.
40As a technical assumption (to avoid complications arising from zero consumption), we actually
assume that yt is strictly bounded above zero ∀t.
41The required modification is replacing β by a state-specific discount factor, which is a function of
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Iterated Euler equation We are interested in the effect of changing the timing
of the premium payment, so we need to compare the marginal utility of consump-
tion across time periods. We can do so using the Euler equation, given in this
model by:
u′(ct) = max{βδRE[u′(c˜t+1)], u′(xt)}(3)
= βδRE[u′(c˜t+1)] + µt(4)
where µt(xt) is the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint, and the tilde
in c˜t+1 represents that the decision is with respect to period-t self’s beliefs about
consumption in period t + 1. We can iterate the Euler equation to span more
periods:
u′(ct) = β(Rδ)HE[u′(c˜t+H)] + λt+Ht(5)
where λt+Ht (xt) is a measure of the extent to which transfers between time t and
time t+H are distorted by (potential) borrowing constraints,42 defined as follows:
λt+Ht = µt + βE[Σ
H−1
i=1 (Rδ)
iµ˜t+i](6)
For the rest of this section we omit the tildes for notational simplicity. Since
all decisions are being made in period 0, all variables are with respect to time 0
beliefs. The following lemma provides the main results from the model which will
be useful when considering the demand for insurance.
LEMMA 1: ∀t ∈ R+:
1) Vt, V
c
t exist, are unique, and are concave.
2) dctdxt < 1, so investments (and wealth in the next period) are increasing in
wealth.
3) d
3Vt
dx3t
,
d3V ct
dx3t
> 0, so the value of risk reduction is decreasing in wealth.
4)
dλt+Ht
dxt
< 0, i.e. the distortion arising from liquidity constraints is decreasing
in wealth.
The intuition behind part 3 of the lemma is as follows. The value of risk re-
duction depends on how much the marginal utility of consumption varies across
states of the world. Two things drive this. First, how much the marginal util-
ity varies for a given change in consumption; this gives rise to the comparative
the marginal propensity to consume. Proposition 2 and Lemma 1 parts 1 and 3 may no longer hold.
Concavity and uniqueness of the continuation value, V ct , is no longer guaranteed, and we have not yet
been able to prove the comparative statics of insurance demand with respect to wealth, because of the
additional complication of the state-dependent discount factor.
42RH +
λt+Ht
βδHE[u′(c˜t+H )]
is the shadow interest rate that the household faces for such transfers.
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static through the standard force of prudence (i.e. u′′′ > 0). Second, how much
consumption varies for a given change in wealth, i.e. the marginal propensity
to consume. Concavity of the consumption function, a consequence of prudence
(Carroll and Kimball 1996) and strengthened by the borrowing constraint (Zeldes
1989; Carroll and Kimball 2005), further drives the comparative static.43
B. Insurance with perfect enforcement
We begin with the case where insurance contracts are perfectly enforceable.
For tractability, at several points we make first order approximations for the
costs and benefits of the insurance contracts. Such approximations are likely to
be reasonable in our setting, as the insurance product offered only provides partial
coverage.44
Timing We assume that the decision of whether to take up insurance is made in
period 0, and any insurance payout is made in period H, the harvest period. Since
the take-up decision is our main focus, and is made in period 0, all expectation
operators in this section are with respect to information at time 0 and we drop
the time subscript below.
Payouts Farmers can buy one unit of the insurance, which gives state-dependent
payout I in period H, normalized so that E[I] = 1. We assume that the random
variable yH + I − 1 second-order stochastically dominates yH .45
Premium We consider two possibilities for the timing of premium payment:
upfront, at time 0; and at harvest, at time H. If paid in period H, the insurance
premium is 1, equal to the expected payout of the insurance (commonly refered
to as the actuarially-fair price).46 If paid upfront, in period 0, the insurance
premium is R−H . Thus, at interest rate R, upfront and at-harvest payment are
equivalent in net present value.
Demand for insurance The farmer buys insurance if the expected benefit of
the payout is greater than the expected cost of the premium. Thus, using first-
43Mathematically, consider the value of a marginal transfer of a state with x + ∆ to a state with x,
assuming both are equally likely. The value of this transfer is (one-half times) V ′(x+∆)−V ′(x) = u′(c(x+
∆))−u′(c(x)) ' u′′(c(x))c′(x)∆. The derivative of this with respect to wealth, x, is ∆(u′′′(c(x))c′(x)2 +
u′′(c(x))c′′(x)), which shows the role of both u′′′ and c′′.
44The premium is small (3% of average revenues) and correspondingly the insurance product has
relatively low coverage (maximum payout of 20% of expected revenue). In addition, there are two other
reasons to believe that a first order approximation is reasonable in our setting. First, we are concerned
with differential take-up according to the timing of the premium payment, so that second order effects
which affect upfront and deductible insurance equally play no role. Second, the double trigger of the
insurance is designed to minimize moral hazard, and many of the inputs are provided by the company.
Thus there is less scope for the insurance to affect input provision. In line with this, as we report in
section V.D, we see no impact of insurance on yield.
45Historical simulations using administrative data suggest this assumption is reasonable in our setting
- while the insurance product does involve basis risk because of the second, area-yield based trigger, this
trigger only prevents payouts to 26% of those who would receive the payout under the single trigger, as
shown in Figure A.1.
46We follow the convention of the literature and denote by the actuarially fair price the price at which
a risk-neutral insurance company would break even, assuming the risk is uncorrelated with market risk
and assuming zero administrative costs.
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order expansions of the value functions, the envelope theorem, and first order
conditions, to first order the take-up decisions are:47
(7)
Take up insurance iff
{
βδHE[u′(cH)] ≤ βδHE[Iu′(cH)] (pay-at-harvest insurance)
R−Hu′(c0) ≤ βδHE[Iu′(cH)] (pay-upfront insurance)
This clarifies the difference between the take-up decisions for pay-upfront and
pay-at-harvest insurance: for pay-at-harvest insurance, the decision is a com-
parsion of the marginal utility of consumption across states (future states when
insurance does pay out vs. when it does not); whereas for pay-upfront insurance,
the decision is a comparison of marginal utility across both states and time (future
states when insurance does pay out vs. today). To relate the two decisions, we
use the iterated Euler equation, equation 5, which gives the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: If farmers are certain they will not be liquidity constrained
before harvest (or almost liquidity constrained - the exact condition is that, upon
purchasing pay-at-harvest insurance, xt − ct > R−H+t for all times t < H and
for all paths) then they are indifferent between the two insurance contracts. If,
however, farmers face a positive probability of being (almost) liquidity constrained,
the expected net benefit of pay-at-harvest insurance is higher than that of upfront
insurance. To first order:
(8)
Difference between expected net benefit
of pay-at-harvest and pay-upfront
= R−HλH0
This difference is equivalent to a proportional price cut in the upfront premium
of
λH0
u′(c0) (< 1).
The intuition for the result is that, since paying the premium at harvest rather
than upfront is akin to holding an extra unit of assets until harvest, any reduction
in cost is purely down to differences in the (shadow) interest rate faced by the
individual and the interest rate offered by the insurer. If, under pay-at-harvest
insurance, liquidity constraints will not be close to binding before harvest, then
asset holdings can simply adjust to offset the difference. In particular, switching
from paying at harvest time to paying upfront, the individual can follow the same
consumption paths so long as they do not now hit the borrowing constraint before
harvest.
One corollary is that to drive a difference between pay-upfront and pay-at-
harvest insurance, intertemporal preferences must act through liquidity constraints.
If discount rates are high then liquidity constraints are likely to be (close to)
binding in some states of the world, even with a precautionary motive for holding
47The first order expansion used is βδHE[V cH(wH + yH + I)]−βδHE[V cH(wH + yH)] ≈ βδHE[Iu′(cH)]
and the first order conditions are V c
′
t (xt) = u
′(ct). We can use the envelope theorem because insurance
payouts I do not enter into constraints before time H.
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assets. A second corollary follows from the relationship between liquidity con-
straints and wealth in the model. Combining Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 gives
the following result, under the assumption that the insurance product provides
just a marginal unit of insurance (so that we can ignore second order and higher
effects).
PROPOSITION 2: Demand for pay-at-harvest insurance is decreasing in wealth.
However, the wedge between pay-upfront and pay-at-harvest insurance is also de-
creasing in wealth. Among farmers who are sure to be liquidity constrained before
the next harvest, the latter dominates and hence their demand for pay-upfront
insurance is increasing in wealth.48
The proposition tell us that, although demand for risk reduction (pay-at-harvest
insurance) is higher among the poor, they may buy less standard (pay-upfront)
insurance than the rich, because the inherent intertemporal transfer is more costly
for them. The intuition is as follows. The value of risk reduction is higher among
the poor, because the poor are more likely to face liquidity constraints after
harvest, meaning that they are less able to self-insure - liquidity constraints make
consumption smoothing in response to shocks harder (so that shocks in income
lead to larger shocks in consumption).49 At the same time, the poor are also
more likely to face liquidity constraints before harvest, which makes paying the
premium upfront more costly than paying at harvest.
More generally, we can consider how the cost of the transfer across time varies
with the parameters of the model. Higher discount rates (i.e. lower β or δ) make
the transfer across time more costly, as they make the borrowing constraint more
likely to bind, and to bind more tightly when it does bind. Higher harvest risk
increases the importance of precautionary savings, meaning farmers save more,
thus reducing the likelihood that liquidity constraints bind before harvest, and
thus making the transfer across time less costly. The effect of risk before harvest
however is less clear, as the inherent savings in upfront insurance are illiquid, and
thus less helpful in smoothing wealth shocks before harvest.
In the above, we have developed the full dynamic problem, and considered the
cost of the intertemporal transfer in terms of the model’s fundamental parameters.
An alternative approach is to use observed investment behavior, in particular the
potential returns of (risk-free) investments which the farmers makes or forgoes, as
a sufficient statistic for the cost of the transfer across time. In appendix section
A.A1 we develop this approach further to bound the effect of the transfer across
time on insurance demand.
48The general point that the gap between pay-upfront and pay-at-harvest insurance is decreasing in
wealth follows from the shadow interest rate being decreasing in wealth. In our model that comes from
a borrowing constraint, but it could be motivated in other ways. Indeed, models sometimes take it as an
assumption (e.g. Dean and Sautmann 2014).
49The value of risk reduction is also higher among the poor for the standard reason of prudence.
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Delaying premium payment by one month
Here we show that, with present bias, delaying the premium payment by just a
short time may increase demand significantly, but only if the farmer is liquidity
constrained. We consider the same insurance product as above, but with the pre-
mium payment instead delayed by one month (corresponding to our experiments
in Section V.C). Thus the premium is due at period 1, and costs R−(H−1). The
following holds:
PROPOSITION 3: The gain in the expected net benefit of insurance from delay-
ing upfront premium payment by one month is, to first order, R−Hλ10 = R−Hµ0.
It is the same as that from a proportional price cut in the upfront premium of
µ0
u′(c0) .
The difference between a one month delay in premium payment and a delay until
harvest time is the difference between λ10 = µ0 and λ
t
0 = µ0 + βE[Σ
H−1
i=1 (Rδ)
iµ˜i].
Thus, since harvest is many months away (i.e. H is large), the effect of a one
month delay is likely to be very small relative to the effect of a delay until harvest,
unless either liquidity constraints are particularly strong this month, or there
is significant present bias. Present bias shrinks the difference between the two
delays (equal to βE[ΣH−1i=1 (Rδ)iµ˜i]) in two ways. First, the effect of future liquidity
constraints are discounted by β, and second, the individual naively believes that
he will be an exponential discounter in the future, and hence is less likely to be
liquidity constrained.
C. Insurance with imperfect enforcement
In small-holder farming settings, contracts are unlikely to be perfectly enforce-
able, with both sides facing counterparty risk. This introduces another difference
between paying upfront and paying at harvest: if the contract breaks before
harvest time, then the farmer does not pay the premium due at harvest, while
he would have already paid the upfront premium. Accordingly, imperfect en-
forcement has implications both for farmer demand for insurance and for the
willingness of insurance companies to supply it, both of which we discuss below.
We use the same setup as above, and introduce the possibility of default on both
sides.
Default. — Farmer. The farmer may strategically default on the harvest time
premium, subject to some (possibly state dependent) utility cost cD of breaking
the contract.
Insurer. Before harvest, with probability pI unrelated to yield, there is a
stochastic shock which causes the insurer to default on the contract.50 In the
50We motivate the assumption that insurer default is exogenous, and in particular unrelated to the
payout due, by the assumption that if the insurer defaults, he defaults on payments due to all farmers,
not selectively. Such default could represent, for example, the insurer going bankrupt or deciding not to
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case of default, upfront premium payments are not reimbursed. We ignore the
possibility of insurer default which occurs after the farmer’s decision to pay the
harvest time premium, since it would not have a differential effect by the timing
of the premium payment.51
Timing. — In period 0, the farmer decides whether to sign up for the in-
surance contract, and in the case of pay-upfront insurance pays the premium.
At the beginning of the harvest period (period H), with probability pI there is
a shock and the insurer defaults on the insurance contract. If the insurer has
not defaulted, the farmer then learns what the insurance payout would be (and
his yield) before, in the case of pay-at-harvest insurance, deciding whether to
default on the premium at utility cost cD.
52 Finally, if the contract still stands,
the insurer pays out any insurance payments due.
The farmer faces two choices: whether to buy the insurance and, in the case
of the pay-at-harvest insurance, whether to pay the premium at harvest time.
Consider first the choice of whether to pay the premium at harvest time. Denoting
the choice to pay by the (state-dependent) indicator function DP , to first order:
DP := I[Iu′(cH) + cD ≥ u′(cH)](9)
Demand for insurance. — Given this defaulting behavior, imperfect con-
tract enforcement drives an additional first-order difference between upfront and
deductible insurance:
Difference in net benefit
of at-harvest & upfront
= R−HλH0︸ ︷︷ ︸
liquidity constraint term
+ βδHpIE[u
′(cH)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
premium saved when
insurer defaults before harvest
(10)
+ βδH(1− pI)E[(1−DP )(u′(cH)− cD − Iu′(cH))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
premium saved, minus cost of default and
loss in insurance payouts, when farmer defaults
It is easy to show that the size of the difference caused by imperfect enforcement
is decreasing in the cost of default, cD. If the cost of default is high enough,
cD > maxs u
′(cH(s)), the farmer never strategically defaults and the additional
difference is just that driven by insurer default.
honor contracts. The assumption is reasonable in our setting, since the strategic default by the insurer
would likely be highly costly for the farming company, both legally and in terms of reputational costs.
51Such default could either be assumed to be accounted for within I, in which case EI < 1, or could
be given by a second stochastic shock. Results below are robust to inclusion of such default.
52In practice he may have considerable uncertainty about both: the company harvests the crop,
increasing uncertainty about the yield, and the area yield trigger in the insurance design increases
uncertainty about the insurance payout. Such uncertainty shrinks the difference between paying upfront
and at harvest compared to that which is derived below.
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Supply of insurance. — While the farmer is better off with the pay-at-
harvest insurance, the possibility for strategic default by the farmer means that
the insurer may be worse off. This is the most likely reason why premiums
are typically charged upfront - if cD = 0, in the case of pay-at-harvest insurance
premiums received are never greater than payouts made, and so the insurer cannot
make a profit at any premium price. But, it is not always clear cut - which of
the two insurance products could actually be traded depends on both cD and pI ,
as well as liquidity constraints and preferences as discussed earlier. We discuss
the supply of insurance further in the Appendix, Section A.A2. Intuitively, a
high risk of insurer default, pI , makes pay-upfront insurance harder to trade (as
does liquidity constrained farmers), and a small cost of farmer default, cD, makes
pay-at-harvest insurance harder to trade.
Interlinked insurance
Interlinking the insurance contract with the production contract has impli-
cations for contractual risk, since default on one entails default on the other.
Typically, farmers face a cost of defaulting on the production contract, and so
such interlinking raises the cost of defaulting on the harvest time premium, cD.
In addition, interlinking may also reduce the risk of the insurer defaulting in the
eyes of the farmer, pI , since the farmer is familiar with the company. However,
interlinking may encourage default on the insurance contract, if the farmer wants
to default on the production contract for other reasons. Given these forces, in
order to understand enforcement of the insurance, we need to understand en-
forcement of the production contract, and how the two interact. To do so we
modify the model developed above, to tie together the insurance and production
contracts, and see how doing so affects default, and ultimately the decision to
purchase insurance.
As in the imperfect enforcement case, the farmer has two decisions to make:
whether to sign up for insurance, and whether to default on the contract at
harvest time. The main difference is in what drives the decision to default, and
what defaulting involves: default now implies more than just not paying the
premium, it also involves selling to another buyer. We refer to doing so as side-
selling, and assume that it results in a state-dependent outside option of o(wH),
net of any loss caused by the loss of the relationship with the buyer. We defer
further discussion of this outside option to the appendix, but note that in our
setting this outside option is generally sufficiently low to avoid farmers defaulting
on the input loans provided by the company, which are substatially larger than
the cost of the insurance premium.
Default. — The timing is as above, and again we solve the farmer’s problem
backwards, starting with the decision of whether to side-sell conditional on the
company not having defaulted on the farming contract. All decisions are as
anticipated at time 0. First consider the case without insurance. We can define
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the (endogenous) cost of side-selling in this case as cD, where we purposely use
the same notation as above:
(11) cD = E[V cH(wH + o(wH))]− E[V cH(wH + yH)]
Unlike in the imperfect enforcement example above, cD may now be positive or
negative. If the farmer values the relationship with the company, and will be paid
more by the company, it will be positive. However, if the farmer doesn’t value
the relationship, and would be paid more by selling to another company, it will
be negative.
Whereas above the farmer may only default in the case of pay-at-harvest in-
surance, now he may have an incentive to default in all three cases: without
insurance, with pay-upfront insurance, and with pay-at-harvest insurance. With-
out insurance, he defaults if cD ≥ 0. With insurance, the net payout of the
insurance contract enters the decision (I in the case of pay-upfront, I − 1 in the
case of pay-at-harvest), but seeing that the absolute value of cD is likely to be
large relative to both the insurance payout and the premium, insurance is un-
likely to affect the decision to default. This is important: defaulting because
cD  0 does not matter for the functioning of the insurance market, whereas
selective defaulting to avoid the premium does. While insurance is unlikely to
affect side-selling, if it does, then the following (simple) proposition tells us how.
PROPOSITION 4: Pay-at-harvest insurance makes those with high yields
more likely to side-sell, and those with low yields less likely to side-sell. Pay-
upfront insurance does not affect side-selling of those with high yields, and
makes those with low yields less likely to side-sell.
The intuition is that, compared to the case with no insurance, those with pay-
upfront insurance may receive the additional insurance payout if they do not
side-sell. In the case of pay-at-harvest insurance, there is also a force in the other
direction: farmers do not have to pay the premium if they side-sell.
Demand for insurance. — The main difference from the previous case is
now it is the expected marginal cost of defaulting induced by the insurance which
matters. For the sake of brevity we omit expressions for the general case here,
but note that if insurance does not affect the decision to side-sell, (in which case
there is only one indicator function D for harvesting with the company), then the
take-up decisions simplify considerably:
(12)
Take up insurance iff
{
βδHE[Du′(cH)] ≤ βδH(1− pI)E[DIu′(cH)] (pay-at-harvest)
R−Hu′(c0) ≤ βδH(1− pI)E[DIu′(cH)] (pay-upfront)
Regardless of whether insurance does affect the decision to side-sell, we have the
following result, which allows us to bound the effect that imperfect enforcement
has on take-up by that of a price cut in the upfront premium.
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PROPOSITION 5: The risk of contract default in the interlinked contract drives
a wedge between demand for pay-at-harvest and pay-upfront insurance. The size
of the wedge is bound above by that of a price cut in the upfront insurance of
P(side-sell with pay-at-harvest)
E[u′(cH)|side-sell with pay-at-harvest]
E[u′(cH)]
This result enables us to relate the impact of ex-ante expectations of default to
the impact of a price cut in the upfront premium, on which we have experimental
evidence from the main experiment. We return to this point in Section V.D.
V. Why does the timing of the premium payment matter?
The model in the previous section showed that liquidity constraints, intertem-
poral preferences, and imperfect contract enforcement could all drive the experi-
mental results presented in Section III. In this section we provide evidence which
suggests that all three of these channels play an important role in constraining
demand for upfront insurance.
Before further discussing the mechanisms which can explain our results, we first
note several which cannot. Since demand for pay-at-harvest insurance is high, and
the only difference with upfront insurance is the timing of the premium payment,
we can rule out many of the mechanisms shown to constrain insurance demand
in other settings. This includes basis risk (the risk that insurance does not pay
out when needed) and the risk preferences of farmers (Clarke 2016; Mobarak
and Rosenzweig 2012; Elabed et al. 2013), the presence of informal insurance
(Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012), and farmer understanding of insurance (Cai,
De Janvry and Sadoulet 2015).
Liquidity constraints are a natural candidate for the gap in demand between
pay-upfront and pay-at-harvest insurance because, as shown in Proposition 1,
they introduce a cost of holding the savings which are implicit in upfront in-
surance. Several studies have documented liquidity constraints among similar
populations in the region of the study (Duflo, Kremer and Robinson 2011; Co-
hen and Dupas 2010) and, also shown in Proposition 1, liquidity constraints may
matter even if they do not bind at the time farmers are offered insurance – they
drive a difference between paying upfront and paying at harvest if there is some
chance they bind before harvest. Liquidity constraints are also tightly tied to
wealth, and Proposition 2 showed that, as a result, they are a larger constraint
on demand for upfront insurance among the poor.
Intertemporal preferences are another important candidate for explaining the
large difference in demand for upfront vs. deduction insurance.53 Among in-
tertemporal preferences, we are particularly interested in present bias. This is
53As shown in Proposition 1, intertemporal preferences only differentially affect the decision to take
up insurance when individuals have a non-zero chance of being liquidity constrained before the next
harvest. As shown by Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2011) and Cohen and Dupas (2010), this is likely
to be the case for some farmers in our setting. Further, liquidity constraints are an endogenous outcome
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for three reasons: first, a recent literature shows evidence that present bias is re-
sponsible for significant distortions in intertemporal decisions in similar settings
(Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin 2003; Duflo, Kremer and Robinson 2011);
second, with present bias, the type of insurance offered has welfare implications,
since the decision to forgo upfront insurance for present consumption is not time
consistent, and future selves may regret it; third, if present bias is driving our
results, the implications for insurance design are very different – as argued in Sec-
tion IV.B, a product under which the premium is paid after take-up, but before
harvest, may still have high demand without the contract enforcement concerns
of a pay-at-harvest insurance.
Finally, imperfect contract enforcement could be responsible for the observed
difference between pay-upfront and pay-at-harvest insurance. If either party de-
faults on the contract before harvesting, the upfront premium is sunk, whereas
the farmer does not pay the premium at harvest. As shown in Section IV, antici-
pation of this possibility can mechanically drive a wedge between the pay-upfront
and pay-at-harvest insurance products.
Before presenting evidence on individual channels, we note that in the main
experiment we elicited measures of preferences over the timing of cash flows,
using standard (Becker-DeGroot) Money Earlier or Later questions (Cohen et al.
2016).54 However, we did not detect heterogeneous treatment effects by these
Required Rate of Return variables, as shown in table A.2. This is possibly driven
by measurement issues, limitations associated with the hypothetical nature of the
questions, and limited statistical power. In addition, standard lab-experiment
measures in a given domain (e.g. the timing of cash disbursement) may fail to
hold predictive power on other domains, such as how to use that money.55
In the rest of this section we do the following. We begin with evidence on
liquidity constraints, first from treatment heterogeneities in the main experiment,
and then from a second experiment. Then we present a third experiment which
targets present bias, before presenting the evidence we have for the importance of
contract risk. Finally, we briefly discuss other, behavioral channels, which could
play a role and which we would like to investigate in future work.
A. Is upfront payment more costly for the poor & the liquidity constrained?
It is often argued that income variation is more costly for the poor, and so
they should have higher demand for risk reduction. Yet the poor demand less
insurance. Proposition 2 showed that the transfer across time in insurance is a
possible explanation – the poor are more likely to be liquidity constrained, and
of the intertemporal optimization problem farmers face, for which intertemporal preferences are of key
importance.
54A recent experimental literature considers what such questions elicit, and suggests difficulties with
using them to measure intertemporal preferences (Andreoni and Sprenger 2012a, Augenblick, Niederle
and Sprenger 2015, Cohen et al. 2016)
55For instance, Kaur, Kremer and Mullainathan (2015) find no correlation between lab experiment
measures of time inconsistency and workers’ choices on effort and labor contracts.
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liquidity constraints increase the cost of paying the premium upfront. Evidence
that the poor often borrow at high interest rates and forgo high return investments
provides weight to this potential explanation. If it is true, in our experiment we
would expect the gap between pay-upfront and pay-at-harvest insurance to be
higher among the poor.
We report how demand for the two types of insurance varies in our experiment
with proxies for wealth and liquidity constraints, and thus the heterogeneous
treatment effect of the transfer across time. The proxies come from both admin-
istrative data and from the baseline survey, and include yield levels in the previous
harvest, sugarcane plot size, number of acres cultivated, whether the household
owns a cow, access to savings and the portion of income from sugarcane. In order
to gain power, we bundle together the two upfront groups (full price and 30%
discount).56 Thus, the regression model is:
(13) Tif = α+ βDeductioni + γxi + δDeductioni ∗ xi + νf + if
Table 3 presents the results, which suggests that the treatment effect does
indeed vary by wealth and liquidity constraints. While not all of the interaction
coefficient estimates are significant, the results in the table show that less wealthy
and more liquidity constrained households are differentially more likely to take-
up the insurance when the premium is to be paid through harvest deduction, as
predicted by proposition 2. For example, delaying premium payment until harvest
time has an effect which is 14 percentage points larger for those who do not own
a cow, and 18 percentage points larger for those who would do not have savings
to cover an emergency requiring a Sh 1,000 ($10) outlay. Further, also in line
with proposition 2, the effect comes from demand for pay-at-harvest insurance
being higher among the poor. From a policy perspective, this result implies that
pay-at-harvest insurance may be particularly beneficial for poorer farmers, who
are typically in stronger need of novel risk management options.
B. Do people buy upfront insurance, given enough cash to do so?
In line with the importance of liquidity constraints, when we surveyed farmers
in the upfront treatment group about why they did not purchase insurance, their
main reason was lack of cash. In this section we present a second experiment
which investigates this further. The experiment answers the question: if farmers
did have the cash to buy upfront insurance, would they do so?
Experimental design
In this experiment, which targeted 120 farmers, we cross cut the pay-upfront
and pay-at-harvest treatments of the main experiment with a cash drop treatment.
Under the cash drop, during the baseline survey enumerators gave farmers an
56We mentioned the option of bundling the two upfront treatment groups when registering the trial.
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amount of cash slightly larger than the price of the insurance premium, around
an hour before company outreach workers offered farmers the insurance product.
The treatment mimics closely one of the arms in Cole et al. (2013). This cross-
cut design allows us to test whether the impact of the cash drop varies across the
pay-upfront vs. pay-at-harvest groups, as well as assessing the relative impact of
the cash drop compared to the premium deferral.
Before presenting results, we first consider what this cash treatment does, and
how we might expect farmers to respond. The first thing we note is that the
cash ensures that farmers do have enough cash to pay for the insurance if they
wish to, removing any hard cash constraint, and addressing the most commonly
cited reason for not purchasing upfront insurance. But, while the cash drop eases
liquidity constraints, it need not remove them entirely - an individual is liquidity
constrained if they are not able to borrow any more at the market interest rate;
after receiving the cash drop, farmers may still have wanted to borrow more.
The experiment is thus best interpreted as answering whether upfront insurance
is the marginal expenditure, given an increase in cash which removes any hard
cash constraints. Evidence from other settings suggests that the answer may be
no. When interlinking insurance with credit, Gine and Yang (2009) and Banerjee,
Duflo and Hornbeck (2014) find that demand for credit actually decreases when
bundled with insurance. If insurance was the marginal expenditure, if anything
we would expect the opposite.
One concern with cash drop designs is that they may induce a reciprocity effect
– to reciprocate the cash gift, farmers may be more likely to buy the insurance
product. We tried to minimize the risk of reciprocity by having the survey enu-
merator give the cash gift at the beginning of the meeting – in contrast, the
insurance product is offered by a company outreach worker, at the end of the
meeting. We discuss further the role of reciprocity below, but note for now that
it can affect demand regardless of the timing of the premium payment, hence the
cross-cut design of our experiment to help to control for it.
Finally, we note that contractual risk is held constant across cash and non-cash
treatment groups, so that any differential take-up is not driven by contractual
risk.57
Experimental results
We use the following regression model:
(14) Tif = α+ βDiscountif + γCashif + νDiscountif ∗ Cashif + ηf + if
Figure 3 presents the results. First, it is reassuring to note that, in this differ-
ent sample, the comparison between the pay-upfront and pay-at-harvest groups
resembles that of the main experiment. Take-up for the upfront group is slightly
57Ignoring any second order effects that the cash drop may have on side-selling, which are likely to be
very small given the size of the cash drop
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larger (13%), but, again, introducing at-harvest payment raises take-up dramat-
ically (up to 76%). Second, the cash drop raises substantively the take-up rate
in the upfront group (up to 33%), suggesting it does reduce liquidity constraints.
However, the impact of the cash drop is much smaller than that of the harvest
time premium - among those who do purchase pay-at-harvest insurance, many
do not purchase pay-upfront insurance even if they do have the cash to do so.
For these individuals upfront insurance is not the marginal expenditure - farmers
prefer to use the additional money for other purposes (e.g. consumption, labor
payments, school fees). Third, the cash drop also has an impact on take-up rates
in the pay-at-harvest group (from 76% to 88%). While in a more complex model
this could potentially be a wealth effect, in our simple model the wealth effect
should if anything reduce insurance demand.58 As mentioned above, this could
also be reciprocity, whereby some farmers may feel obliged to purchase the insur-
ance after receiving the transfer, as discussed in Cole et al. (2013). The difference
in impact of the cash drop between farmers offered the at-harvest premium and
those offered the upfront premium is 8%, which is small. While it is imprecisely
estimated, we take this as evidence that the cash drop had relatively little effect
on take-up beyond that caused by reciprocity.59
Table 4 confirms the patterns described above. Column (1) presents the basic
level impact of the cash drop and pay-at-harvest treatments. We add field fixed
effects in column (2) and additional controls in column (3). Across the specifica-
tions, we can always reject the null on the equality of the two treatments at the
1% level. The coefficient on Cash is large and significant at the 5% level in column
(1) and remains similar in size but loses some precision as we add more controls.
In columns (4) to (6), we look at the interaction between the two treatments.
The coefficient on the interaction is always negative, as we would expect, but it is
small and insignificant. It is imprecisely estimated, but even at the upper bound
of the (very wide) confidence interval it cannot account for half of the difference
between pay-upfront and pay-at-harvest insurance in the main experiment.
To summarize, the results show that cash drops do relatively little to close the
gap between pay-upfront and pay-at-harvest insurance. There are two potential
explanations: farmers are not liquidity constrained, or farmers are very liquid-
ity constrained and hence insurance is not the marginal expenditure. The next
experiment will help to disentangle the two, since it should only find an effect if
farmers are liquidity constrained.
C. Does delaying the premium payment by one month increase take-up?
If present bias is a major driver of our results, then delaying the premium
payment by just a short amount of time may affect take-up. Here we describe
58This wealth effect is likely to be small.
59Interpreting the difference-in-difference is also made more difficult because we have to make an
assumption on how reciprocity affects the probability of take-up. We use a linear probability model, and
so implicitly assume that reciprocity affects the probability of take-up linearly.
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a third experiment in which we did exactly this. We begin by introducing the
experimental design, referencing the earlier theoretical discussion of Section IV.B
to explain exactly what the experiment tests. Then we present the results, which
suggest that present bias does play an important role.
Experimental design
The aim of the experiment was to compare insurance take-up when the premium
had to be paid at sign-up, to insurance take-up when the premium payment was
delayed until one month later. However, for reasons explained below, the design
was slightly different. A sample of 120 farmers was randomly allocated to two
treatment groups.60 Both groups were offered a choice between either a cash
payment, equal to the insurance premium, or free enrollment in the insurance.
The difference between the treatment groups was when they would receive what
they chose. In the first treatment group, the Receive Choice Now group, farmers
were told that they would receive what they chose immediately. In the second
group, the Receive Choice in One Month group, farmers were told that they would
receive what they chose in one month’s time (the cash payment offered to farmers
in this case also included one month of interest).
Offering the choice between cash or the insurance for free, rather than the choice
to buy insurance, allowed us to isolate the role of intertemporal preferences in two
ways. First, it ensured that the choice in the Receive Choice in One Month group
could be enforced (since the premium payment the following month did not rely
on the farmer paying out of her own pocket). Second, like a cash drop, it relaxed
any hard cash constraints, ensuring the farmer could take-up the insurance if he
wanted to. In standard models, take-up under this choice should be the same as
take-up when the farmer is given the choice to purchase insurance following a cash
drop, as in the cash constraints experiment above. But a literature dating back
to Knetsch and Sinden (1984)61 suggests the two may be different: the former is
akin to the Willingness to Accept, whereas the latter is the Willingness to Pay
and may include an endowment effect.
As shown in Section IV.B, for a one month delay in premium payment to have
made a difference, the farmer must have been liquidity constrained at the time of
the experiment. If the effect is large, it suggests one of three things, two of which
we argue were unlikely in our setting. First, credit constraints may have varied
across time periods (Dean and Sautmann 2014), and the experiment could have
happened to take place at a time of large and very short-run liquidity constraints
(for example due to an aggregate shock). However, we ran the experiments across
two months (plus a one-month pilot beforehand) and the results, presented below,
are stable across these periods, suggesting this explanation is unlikely. Second, if
farmers were heavy exponential discounters, i.e. they had low δ, then they would
60Randomization was again stratified at the field level.
61See Horowitz and McConnell (2002) for a summary of the literature.
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have preferred to pay one month later. However, even with a one month delay,
insurance still involves a transfer across a large time period, and so in this case
the farmer would still have been unlikely to buy it. Thus, if we find a large effect,
we are left with just the third possibility: farmers were present biased.
Appendix Table A.5 reports the balance test across the two groups. We note
that, due to the small sample size, there are significant imbalances across the two
groups in the share of men and the acres of land cultivated. As discussed below,
results are robust to the inclusion of these variables as controls.
Experimental results
Figure 4 shows that the take-up share in the Receive Choice in One Month
group is 72%, compared to a baseline of 51% in the Receive Choice Now group.62
This 21 percentage point increase suggests that a shift of only one month in the
timing of the cash transfer (while keeping the net present value constant) has
a large impact on insurance take-up. While the experimental design does not
allow us to distinguish between time-consistent and time-inconsistent discounting
directly,63 the large effect is inconsistent with exponential discounting, as argued
above. In contrast, it is consistent with present bias, as the Receive Choice in
One Month treatment provides farmers with a commitment device on how to use
the cash transfer, potentially overcoming their time inconsistency.
Table 5 confirms these results across different specifications. The gap between
the two treatments remains statistically significant at 1% when adding field fixed
effects, plot controls, farmer controls and both set of controls together. We note
that the point estimate raises from 0.25 in the baseline specification with field
fixed effects (Column 2) to 0.33 when adding both set of controls, though the
difference in the two estimates is not statistically significant. This suggests that,
if anything, accounting for the baseline imbalances reported above increases the
estimate of the impact of requiring farmers to sign up in advance.
We note that the design mitigates the traditional trust concerns associated
to standard time preferences experiments (Andreoni and Sprenger 2012b). In the
Receive Choice in One Month treatment, both the cash transfer and the insurance
sign-up depend on the field officer revisiting the field, so there are no differential
trust concerns across the two choices. It is still possible, though implausible,
62We note that the baseline take-up for the “Receive Choice Now” group is larger than the take-up in
the group Upfront Premium+Cash in the Liquidity Constraints experiment, which could be due to several
factors. First, there could be variation across farmer characteristics as the two experiments targeted
different samples. Second, as mentioned above, this experiment estimates the willingness to accept for
upfront insurance, whereas the liquidity constraint experiment estimates the willingness to pay, given
liquidity. In particular, there may be an endowment effect in the latter associated with handing the cash
to farmers at the start of the visit. Third, while the Liquidity Constraints experiment occurred early in
late Summer 2014, the Intertemporal Preferences experiment was implemented in Spring 2015, shortly
after the end of the dry season (December-March). It is possible this could make the risk of low harvest
more salient for the farmers.
63In particular, sample size limitations prevented us from running an additional treatment where the
cash transfer is postponed by two months, rather than one, and concerns about new information being
a confounder prevented us from asking farmers to revisit their decision one month later.
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that a farmer may think the field officers are more likely to return if she chooses
the insurance. However, visits are organized at the field level and thus revisits
cannot depend on individual choices. Further, and probably most importantly,
the respondents have the contact info of the relevant company field staff (and, in
most cases, of the IPA staff).
While present bias can lead to under subscription in pay-upfront insurance, one
might think that it could also lead to over subscription and hence future regret
in pay-at-harvest insurance. While we believe that this is a real possibility with
the sale of goods on credit, where benefits are borne immediately, in the case of
insurance there is no clear immediate benefit to subscription. On the contrary,
pay-at-harvest insurance eliminates the time gap between cost and benefit that
standard insurance products introduce. In line with this argument, as discussed
above, in follow-up calls with 40 farmers who took-up the pay-at-harvest insur-
ance, only 7.5% of farmers said they would not take-up the product again.
D. Imperfect enforcement
In the case of the harvest time premium, if either party defaults on the con-
tract before harvesting, the farmer does not pay the premium. Anticipation of
this possibility mechanically drives a wedge between take-up of the pay-upfront
and pay-at-harvest insurance products, as shown in Section IV.C. While the two
experiments described above show that counterparty risk does not fully explain
our results, since they hold it almost constant across treatments, it is likely that
farmers had a non-zero prior for the probability of contract default. In this sec-
tion we attempt to understand the importance of this channel.64 We first discuss
what happened under the contracts, and then detail the evidence that we have
for the effect of imperfect enforcement on take-up decisions. While we find some
evidence that counterparty risk did matter for overall levels of take-up, we find
no evidence for a differential effect by the timing of the premium payment.
Before the farmers in our study were due to harvest, the contract-farming com-
pany ran into serious financial difficulties. These financial difficulties led to the
closure of the factory for several months, during which time the company did not
harvest any cane, and to subsequent severe delays in harvesting due to the back-
log. Consequently, the farmers whose cane was mature during this time faced
uncertainty around harvesting: when it would happen, and whether it would
happen at all. As a result, unsurprisingly, a significant proportion of our farm-
ers side-sold (i.e. did not sell to the company). Figure 6 shows that the rate of
side-selling was 52% across the three experiments. Figure 5 is a histogram of the
64In the main experiment we collected several variables related to trust and farmers’ relationship with
the company. However, the heterogeneity analysis does not deliver any clear conclusion. In addition
to limited power, it is possible that the variables do not properly capture the specific expectations and
trust concerning the insurance product. We report the results in Table A.1. While the failure to detect
heterogeneity in the treatment effect along these variables poses an obvious caveat, qualitative evidence
from the survey provides suggestive evidence that the interlinked insurance contract may help to address
trust issues and we hope it will motivate further work on the topic.
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harvest rate (one minus the side-selling rate) by sublocation, and also for compar-
ison shows a histogram of a lower bound65 for the historical harvest rate in the
same locations. The figure shows that default was much higher than historical
rates, and underlines the fact that farmers face counterparty risk under upfront
insurance contracts.
The widespread default ex-post raises two important questions: did the insur-
ance product induce side-selling; and were expectations of default responsible for
the difference in take-up, ex-ante?
Insurance did not affect side-selling
There is no evidence that insurance affected side-selling, in line with the design
of the insurance product and the assumptions and arguments of our model. Figure
6 shows that the share of plots which side-sold is similar across treatment groups,
in spite of very different levels of insurance take-up. However, it is not the level
of side-selling, but whether or not it is selective which is important for whether
pay-at-harvest insurance could be offered in equilibrium, as shown in Subsection
IV.C. Proposition 4 showed that, with pay-at-harvest insurance, those with low
yields are less likely to side-sell and those with high yields are more likely to,
and these two effects could cancel each other out. However, if that were the
case, we would expect yield conditional on selling to the company to be higher
among the upfront insurance group, and we see no evidence of this in Figure 7
(we can rule out a 15% standard deviation effect on yield). Further, yield (or
more precisely, insurance payout) conditional on not side-selling is what matters
for the functioning of the market. The fact that pay-at-harvest insurance has
little effect on yield is again consistent with some of the features of the insurance
product that may inhibit selection (i.e., the double trigger and the limited scope
for changing inputs).66
Did anticipation of default affect take-up differentially?
Given the extent of side-selling, it is particularly important for us to consider
how important ex-ante expectations of contract risk were in driving our main
result. We use two main pieces of evidence to argue that the role was limited.
Before doing so, we first reiterate that the additional experiments explained above
hold constant contractual risk, and thus show that both liquidity constraints
and present bias are part of the story. Further, in the Receive Choice in One
Month treatment, which is a completely upfront product and thus fully exposed
65The historical measure of the harvesting rate is a lower bound on the true harvesting rate because
of the data we had available to construct it. The measure is constructed as the proportion of farmers
who previously harvested a Plant or Ratoon 1 cycle who appear in the data as harvesting the subsequent
cycle. However, some of these farmers will have uprooted the crop after harvesting, and thus will never
have begun the subsequent cycle.
66Besides selection concerns, One might also worry that insurance induced moral hazard. However,
moral hazard, if present, would work in the same direction as conditional side selling, in that the pay-
at-harvest treatment group would show higher levels of moral hazard and thus lower yields.
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to contract risk, take-up reached 72%, suggesting that the expected probability
of default was unlikely to be high.
Our first argument for why the role of contract risk was limited relies on Propo-
sition 5, which tells us that we can bound the differential effect on take-up of
ex-ante expectations on contract default by that of a price cut in the upfront
premium. In particular, the differential effect is less than that of a proportional
price cut in the premium, of the expected probability of side-selling weighted by
the relative marginal utility of consumption when side-selling. However, in our
main experiment, a 30% price cut made almost no difference to take-up of upfront
insurance, suggesting a low price elasticity. Thus, unless ex-ante expectations of
either the probability of default or of the marginal utility of consumption in the
case of default are extremely high, imperfect enforcement is unlikely to account for
a large part of the difference in take-up between pay-upfront and pay-at-harvest
treatments. We cannot rule out high marginal utility in the case of default - it is
possible that default is associated with significant financial stress for the farmer
– but it would have to be very high to explain a large fraction of our results.67
Our second argument for the limited role of contract risk considers heteroge-
neous treatment effects of delaying the premium payment, by plausible proxies
for ex-ante expectations of the probability of default. If the ex-ante probability of
default did drives a difference in take-up between pay-upfront and pay-at-harvest
insurance, and there was heterogeneity in the probability, then, conditional on
other covariates, we would expect a take-up regression to show a positive interac-
tion between proxies for the probability of default and the harvest time premium.
We consider two such proxies for the probability of default. First, in the baseline
survey, we asked respondents about their trust in, and relationship with, the com-
pany. Table A.1 shows that while some of these measures do predict overall levels
of take-up (consistent with a belief that the company will not make insurance
payouts even if the production contract is upheld), they do not predict take-up
differentially by premium timing. Second, we consider actual side-selling, both of
individual farmers and of local averages (Figure 5 shows that there was substan-
tial geographical variation in side-selling), and both in the season in question and
in the previous season. For measures of side-selling in the season in question, this
is based on the assumption that the actual realization of side-selling was corre-
lated with the ex-ante probability of side-selling, and comes with the caveat that
we are conditioning on an ex-post variable. Table A.3 shows that also we find no
evidence for heterogeneous treatment effects for any of these proxies for ex-ante
expectations of contract default.
67The difference with the effect of liquidity constraints is that the liquidity constraints channel is
subject to the effect of present bias, as well as any other risks in the period between the take-up decision
and harvest time which may lead the household to be liquidity constrained, and the one month experiment
showed that just a one month delay has a significant effect.
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E. Other channels
This section briefly discusses several additional channels which could also drive
a difference in take-up between upfront and deduction premium treatment groups.
We have no evidence for these channels and leave an experimental analysis of them
to future work.
First, according to relative thinking (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, Azar 2007),
people may make choices based on relative differences in costs, even when the ra-
tional model dictates that they should only consider absolute differences. In our
setting, the premium could be perceived as a large amount when farmers consider
it as an isolated expense, but as a small amount once farmers consider it as a
share of their harvest revenues.68 As such, the large difference in take-up between
pay-upfront and pay-at-harvest insurance could be more to do with the latter be-
ing charged as a deduction, rather than the timing per se. A similar explanation
is also offered by Salience Theory. If we interpret the model of Bordalo, Gennaioli
and Shleifer (2012) as one of multiple time periods, diminishing sensitivity sug-
gests that the upfront payment period may be more salient than the harvest time
payment period; since income will be higher at harvest time. Salience also pro-
vides a similar explanation to quasi-hyperbolic discounting for why charging the
premium in the future may result in higher demand than charging it at take-up,
even without the future premium being charged as a deduction.
A second mechanism which could be responsible is prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979; Ko˝szegi and Rabin 2007). While a thorough application of
the theory is beyond the scope of this paper,69 intuitively upfront payments may
fall in the loss domain, while deduction payments, at least when yield are high,
may be perceived as lower gains. The fact that farmers may be more sensitive
to losses than gains may then partially explain the large response to the timing
of premium payment. This channel is again more related to the harvest time
premium being charged as a deduction, rather than being paid later.
Since the pay-at-harvest insurance requires no payment at sign up, there is a
third possible mechanism: a zero-price today effect. Empirical studies find a jump
in demand at zero price across a wide range of settings (Cohen and Dupas 2010).
A possibility, about which we are unaware of any papers, is that there is a similar
effect when there is a zero upfront price, i.e. no payment to be paid at purchase.
Such an effect could be an alternative explanation for the finding in Tarozzi et al.
(2014) that offering anti-malarial bednets through loans has a large effect on take-
up. It would also help to explain the prevalence of zero down-payment financing
options for many consumer purchases, such as cars as furniture.
68We thank Nathan Nunn for pointing out this explanation.
69Such an application would require defining how the reference point is set, both for the time at which
the upfront premium is paid and for harvest time.
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VI. External validity
The previous results show that charging the premium upfront, rather than
at the same time as any payout would be made, reduced demand significantly
for an agricultural insurance product in Kenya, and that liquidity constraints
and intertemporal preferences play an important role. A wide body of work
documents that these mechanisms also shape financial decisions in the developed
world. For instance, a literature starting with Deaton (1991) and Zeldes (1989)
points at the relationship between liquidity constraints and saving decisions, and
Laibson (1997) sparked a body of empirical investigations on the impact of time-
inconsistency on savings. Further, a recent literature on payday lending shows
that some pay extremely high interest rates.
In the final section of the paper, we consider the implications of the intertem-
poral transfer in insurance contracts in developed countries, where better legal
institutions may make the enforcement of cross-state insurance easier, but better
functioning financial markets may also make the transfer across time matter less.
We present empirical evidence from a natural experiment that, in spite of this,
the timing of the premium payment also affects adoption of crop insurance among
farmers in the U.S..
A. Evidence from U.S. Federal Crop Insurance
We exploit a natural experiment concerning the timing of the U.S. Federal Crop
Insurance (FCI) premium payment. The FCI is the largest insurance scheme in
the world, with a total of around 2 million policies sold in 2010. The program,
which offers both crop-yield and crop-revenue insurance, is heavily subsidized
by the federal government (Wright 2014). Historically, under the FCI farmers
pay the insurance premium around harvest time, similar to the pay-at-harvest
premium in our experiment. But this changed for some crops, in some states, in
2012.
Empirical design
The 2008 Farm Act70 (the relevant part of which was implemented in 2012)
moved the premium payment earlier in the season for certain crops, typically to
around two to three months before harvesting. Crucially for our identification
strategy, the change in timing varied across crops and states. For corn, the
most common grain grown in the United States, the billing date shifted earlier
throughout the country (from October to August). For wheat, the second most
common grain, the billing date changed only for states growing mostly spring
wheat (North West and Midwest), but not for those states growing winter wheat
(Central and South).
70Public Law 110-234.
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To test the effect of this change on crop insurance adoption, we exploit the
variation over time and across states and crops to implement a triple difference
approach at the county level. For this purpose, we obtained data from the Risk
Management Agency on the number of crop insurance policies sold between 2009
and 2014 by crop and county. We focus on states that harvest at least 500,000
acres of both corn and wheat in 2010, and we include only counties that grew both
grains in the same year. The final sample includes 11 states and 899 counties.
Equation 15 shows the estimating equation of our triple-difference approach:
(15) IHS(Policies)cskt = β1Postt ∗ Treatsk + ηck + ηst + ηkt + ηskt+ sckt,
where the dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the
number of insurance policies sold in county c in state s in crop k in year t. In
years after 2012, the dummy variable Treatsk equals one if the state-crop pair is
exposed to the reform. The model includes county-crop fixed effects (ηck), state-
year fixed effects (ηst), crop-year fixed effects (ηkt), and a time trend estimated
separately for each state-crop (ηsk ∗ t). We cluster standard errors by state-crop,
as that is the level of our treatment.
β1 identifies the effect of the earlier premium payment on take-up under the
identifying assumption that, upon including all of the fixed effects listed above,
county-level take-up of crop insurance had common trends across both corn and
wheat, absent the policy change.
To assess the importance of wealth and liquidity constraints in this new setting,
we also test whether the reform had differential impact by the average plot size in
the county-crop, measured in acres. To do so we augment the model to estimate
a heterogeneous treatment effect term (Postt ∗ Treatsk ∗AvgPolicySizeck):
(16)
IHS(Policies)sckt = β1Postt ∗ Treatsk + β2Postt ∗ Treatsk ∗ IHS(AvgPolicySize)ck
+ ηck + ηst + ηkt + ηk ∗ Postt ∗ IHS(AvgPolicySize)ck
+ ηs ∗ Postt ∗ IHS(AvgPolicySize)ck
+ ηsk ∗ IHS(AvgPolicySize)ck ∗ t+ sckt
This model allows average plot size to impact the dependent variable differentially
in each state and crop after 2012 (terms ηk ∗Postt ∗ IHS(AvgPolicySize)ck and
ηs ∗ Postt ∗ IHS(AvgPolicySize)ck). It also includes the interaction between
the state-crop specific trends and the average policy size by county-crop (ηsk ∗
IHS(AvgPolicySize)ck ∗ t).
Empirical results
Table 7, Column (1) estimates equation 15. It shows that the change in timing
reduced the number of insurance policies sold in the county-crop by approximately
4.3%. Column (2) estimates equation 16. An increase of 10% in the average
county plot size reduces the negative impact of the reform on insurance adoption
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by 0.52%. This results is confirmed in Column (3) where we add state-crop-year
fixed effects.71 Column (4) replaces the average county-crop plot size variable with
a dummy for whether the county-crop average plot size is above the median for
that state-crop. The regression confirms the findings of column (2) and suggests
the negative impact of Column (1) is entirely driven by counties with farms below
median size, in line with Proposition 2, which says that the difference in timing
should only matter for those who risk facing liquidity constraints. Column (5)
shows that this result is again robust to the inclusion of state-crop-year fixed
effects.
The negative and statistically significant impact of the reform on insurance
adoption suggests that the mechanisms driving the results of our experiment in
Kenya may also affect risk management choices for farmers in developed countries,
albeit with a lower intensity. This could be why the FCI premium has historically
been due around harvest time. As in our experiment, the effect of the 2012 reform
was largest among smaller farmers, in line with Proposition 2 and with the role
of liquidity constraints. The effect is unsurprisingly much smaller than in our
experiment. There are several natural explanations: the change in timing is
much smaller (and does not interact with any present bias, since in both cases
premiums are due in the future); farmers in the US may be less likely to be
liquidity constrained; and finally, very importantly, late premium payments for
FCI are only penalized by a penalty interest rate of 1.25% per month (within
reason – beyond a certain date insurance access is revoked for subsequent seasons),
which bounds the size of the possible effect of earlier payment.
VII. Conclusion
By requiring that the premium be paid upfront, standard insurance contracts
introduce a fundamental difference between their goal and what they do in prac-
tice: they not only transfer income across states, they also transfer income across
time. We have argued that this transfer across time is at the heart of several ex-
planations offered for the low take-up of insurance, such as liquidity constraints,
present bias, and trust in the insurer. Once the temporal dimension of insurance
contracts is taken into account, we have shown that a standard borrowing con-
straint can resolve the puzzlingly low demand for insurance among the poor –
while the poor have greater demand for risk reduction, they face a higher cost of
paying the premium upfront.
In the context of crop insurance, the transfer across time can be removed by
charging the premium at harvest time, rather than upfront. Doing so in our ex-
periment, by charging the premium as a deduction from harvest revenues in a
contract farming setting, resulted in a high level of insurance take-up at actuari-
ally fair prices. In contrast, when the premium was charged upfront, take-up for
the same insurance product was 67 percentage points lower, and the effect of the
71In this model, we drop state-year fixed effects, crop year fixed effects and the state-crop trends.
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timing was largest among the poorest.
We discussed the numerous channels which could be responsible for our main
experimental result, and presented evidence which showed that two of the three
most natural ones play a role. Heterogeneous treatment effects suggested that
liquidity constraints mattered, and a first experiment on channels showed that
they ran deeper than simply not having the cash to pay the premium. A second
experiment on channels provided further evidence for the importance of liquidity
constraints, and showed that present bias was also a significant constraint on the
demand for upfront insurance, since take-up rose substantially when the premium
payment was delayed by one month. Finally, we considered the role of contractual
risk. A lack of trust in the insurance provider is a common reason given for
not buying not buying insurance in similar settings, and ours was no different:
heterogeneous treatment effects showed that insurance take-up was higher overall
among those who trusted the company. But, while contractual risk may drive a
difference between take-up of pay-upfront and pay-at-harvest insurance, in our
setting, we find no evidence across multiple tests for such a differential effect, in
spite of a financial shock which led to high levels of default among our farmers
before harvest.
In the final contribution of the paper, we showed that the intertemporal transfer
has implications for crop insurance in other settings, using a natural experiment
from the U.S. It may well also have implications for other types of insurance. The
most immediate comparison is with other production insurance products, but
implications may be broader, as most insurance products have an intertemporal
transfer. For example, the transfer across time may help to explain the low take-
up for rare-disaster insurance – by definition payouts of such insurance products
are rare, meaning long expected delays between payment and payout, and thus
potentially large effects of small differences in interest rates faced by insurance
companies and their clients. Two exceptions, i.e. insurance products which do
not have a transfer across time, are the Federal Crop Insurance program detailed
above and social insurance. The government is involved in the provision of both,
which could in part be because cross-state insurance is hard to enforce. An
alternative policy would be for the government to simply provide a loan, and
allow individuals to buy standard insurance if they want to. However, under
present bias, this alternative may have negative welfare implications. Further,
whereas cross-state insurance only has to be paid for in the good state of the
world, the loan would have to be paid for in bad states of the world too, and
limited liability could reduce the incentive to buy insurance through the standard
asset substitution problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
From a policy perspective, boosting crop insurance take-up is an ongoing chal-
lenge. The results in this paper show that changing the timing of the premium
payment represents a promising idea for doing so, which warrants replication in
other settings. While the enforcement mechanism used in the paper could be
used in most contract farming settings, whose presence is growing steadily in de-
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veloping countries (UNCTAD 2009), two questions which we hope to investigate
in future work are particularly important to understand whether the idea could
be applied more widely.
First, in order to boost take-up, does the premium need to be paid at harvest
time, or is there another timing which would have a similar effect? This question is
important because of enforcement: the earlier the premium is paid, the less there
is room for moral hazard on its payment. Our one month experiment suggests
that just delaying the premium payment slightly may have a sizeable effect on
take-up. But seasonality may be important too - if the premium was paid at the
previous harvest time, rather than early on in the agricultural season, farmers
may be less liquidity constrained, and thus more willing to purchase insurance. A
related question is whether there are other timings of the insurance payout which
farmers would prefer. Even in a bad season farmers may well have liquidity at
harvest time, only running out later in the season - especially under present bias.
If farmers are sophisticated, then they may prefer an insurance product which
pays out later in the season, when times are hardest.
Second, if the premium is charged at (subsequent) harvest time, are there other
ways to enforce payment by the farmer, beyond interlinking the product and
insurance markets? A comparison to credit suggests there could be: the en-
forcement constraint for cross-state insurance is, if anything, easier than that for
credit, since in the case of insurance a net payment is only required in good states
of the world. Whether methods used to ensure repayment in credit, such as rela-
tional contracting, group liability, and credit scores could be used for cross-state
insurance is an important question.
In addition to improving the enforcement of a premium paid at harvest, we note
finally that interlinking insurance and production contracts can benefit insurance
design and administration in several other ways. The first concerns data availabil-
ity. For administrative purposes, large buyers in contract farming schemes often
collect detailed plot-level data, including output and farm sizes. These records,
which can span for decades, can address data limitations for costing insurance
products, a fundamental constraint in the design of area yield products (Elabed
et al. 2013). This could be particularly relevant as area yield insurance may dis-
play lower basis risk than rainfall index insurance, as was the case in our setting.
Second, administrative costs are likely to be lower. For example, company field
assistants already visit farmers’ plots at contract inception, and in an interlinked
contract that visit could include insurance recruitment, at minimal additional
cost. This would reduce the gap between actuarially fair premiums and market
premiums, which can be large.72 Third, getting people to renew their insurance
contracts has been a challenge in other settings, with high dropout rates among
farmers who do not receive an insurance payout in the first season (Cole, Stein
and Tobacman 2014, Cai, de Janvry and Sadoulet 2016). Under an interlinked
contract, farmers could credibly sign up for insurance contracts which cover mul-
72In Karlan et al. (2014), market prices are 50% higher than actuarially fair prices.
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tiple seasons, increasing the chance that they receive an insurance payout before
policy renewal is due. Finally, evidence that farmers increase their productive
investments and output when insured (Karlan et al. 2014) provides another ra-
tionale for interlinked contracts. If product buyers are partial residual claimants
on farmers’ production, they make a profit on the additional quantities produced.
Thus, unlike a third party insuring agent, they may not need to break even on
the insurance sales.
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Figure 1. : Experimental design
(a) Design of Main Experiment
N=605
Insurance premium: upfront upfront with 30% discount at harvest
Notes: The experimental design randomized 605 farmers (approximately) equally across three treatment
groups. All farmers were offered an insurance product; the only thing varied across treatment groups
was the premium. In the first group (U1), farmers were required to pay the (“actuarially-fair”) pre-
mium upfront, as is standard in insurance contracts. In the second group (U2), premium payment was
again required upfront, but farmers received a 30% discount relative to (U1). In the third group (H),
the full-priced premium would be deducted from farmers’ revenues at (future) harvest time, including
interest charged at the same rate used for the inputs the company supplies on credit (1% per month).
Randomization across these treatment groups occurred at the farmer level and was stratified by Field,
an administrative unit of neighboring farmers.
(b) Design of Cash Constraints Experiment
N=120
Insurance premium: upfront at harvest
Cash drop: no yes no yes
Notes: The experimental design randomized 120 farmers (approximately) equally across four treatment
groups. The design cross-cut two treatments: pay-upfront vs. pay-at-harvest insurance, as in the main
experiment, and a cash drop. At the beginning of individual meetings with farmers, those selected to
receive cash were given an amount which was slightly larger than the insurance premium, and then at the
end of the meetings farmers were offered the insurance product. Randomization across these treatment
groups occurred at the farmer level and was stratified by Field, an administrative unit of neighboring
farmers.
(c) Design of Present Bias Experiment
N=120
Receive cash or insurance: now in one month
Notes: The experimental design randomized 120 farmers (approximately) equally across two treatment
groups. Farmers in both groups were offered a choice between either a cash payment, equal to the “full-
priced” insurance premium, or free enrollment in the insurance. Both groups had to make the choice
during the meeting, but there was a difference in when it would be delivered. In the first treatment group,
the Receive Choice Now group, farmers were told that they would receive their choice immediately. In
the second group, the Receive Choice in One Month group, farmers were told that they would receive
their choice in one month’s time (the cash payment offered to farmers in this case included an additional
month’s interest).
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Figure 2. : Main Experiment: Insurance Take-Up by Treatment Group
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Notes: The figure shows insurance take-up rates across the three treatment groups in the main exper-
iment. In the Pay Upfront group, farmers had to pay the full-price premium when signing up to the
insurance. In the Pay Upfront + 30% Discount group, farmers also had to pay the premium at sign-up,
but received a 30% price reduction. In the Pay At Harvest group, if farmers signed up to the insurance,
then the premium (including accrued interest at 1% per month) would be deducted from their revenues
at (future) harvest time. The bars capture 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3. : Cash Constraints Experiment: Insurance Take-Up by Treatment
Group
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Notes: The figure shows insurance take-up rates across the four treatment groups in the cash constraints
experiment. In the Pay Upfront group, farmers had to pay the premium when signing up for the
insurance. In the Pay Upfront + Cash group, farmers were given a cash drop slightly larger than the
cost of the premium, and had to pay the premium at sign-up. In the Pay At Harvest group, if farmers
signed up for the insurance then the premium (including accrued interest at 1% per month) would be
deducted from their revenues at (future) harvest time. In the Pay At Harvest + Cash group, farmers
were given a cash drop equal to the cost of the premium and premium payment was again through
deduction from harvest revenues. The bars capture 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 4. : Present Bias Experiment: Insurance Take-Up by Treatment Group
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Notes: The figure shows insurance take-up rates across the two treatment groups in the present bias
experiment. In the Receive Now group, farmers chose between an amount of money equal to the premium
and free subscription to the insurance, knowing that they would receive their choice straight away. In
the Receive in One Month group, farmers made the same choice, but knowing that they would receive
whatever they chose one month later. The bars capture 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 5. : Histogram of Harvesting With Company, by Sublocation
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Notes: The histogram shows the proportion of farmers who harvested with the company in the subloca-
tions in which we undertook the experiment. The data is by sublocation and we plot separate histograms
for the main experiment (which is just for the farmers in our sample, who were due to harvest approx-
imately twelve months after our experiment) and for the period prior to the experiment, from 2011 to
2014 (which is for all farmers in the sublocations). The historical measure is a lower bound on the harvest
rate, since it is calculated as the proportion who harvested in the previous cycle who do not harvest this
cycle, some of whom will not have grown cane this cycle. We note two things from the histograms.
First, harvesting with the company is much lower during the experiment than historically, in line with
the financial troubles at the company. Second, there is a large amount of geographic variation in the
harvesting rate among farmers in our sample.
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Figure 6. : Contractual Default: Proportion Who Harvest with Company in Main
Experiment
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Notes: The figure shows the proportion of farmers from the main experiment who subsequently harvested
with the company, as agreed under the contract. In the Pay Upfront group, farmers had to pay the full-
price premium when signing up for the insurance. In the Pay Upfront + Discount group, farmers had to
pay the premium at sign-up but received a 30% price reduction. In the Pay At Harvest group, premium
payment was through deduction from (future) harvest revenues, and included the accrued interest. The
bars capture 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 7. : Contractual Default: Harvest Weight Conditional on Harvesting with
Company in Main Experiment
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Notes: The figure shows the harvest weight, conditional on harvesting with the company, for farmers
in the main experiment. In the Pay Upfront group, farmers had to pay the full-price premium when
signing up for the insurance. In the Pay Upfront + Discount group, farmers had to pay the premium
at sign-up but received a 30% price reduction. In the Pay At Harvest group, premium payment was
through deduction from (future) harvest revenues, and included the accrued interest. The bars capture
95% confidence intervals.
54
Table 1—: Main Experiment: Balance Table, Baseline Variables
Upfront Upfront-30% Harvest P-value P-value P-value P-value
[U1] [U2] [H] [U1-U2] [U1-H] [U2-H] [U-H] N
Plot Size (Acres) .309 .340 .319 .012** .187 .219 .875 605
(.128) (.147) (.133)
Previous Yield 53.9 56.8 55.7 .23 .112 .67 .581 605
(17.2) (18.0) (17.7)
Man .670 .731 .671 .114 .732 .387 .779 571
(.471) (.444) (.470)
Age 48.3 48.3 45.4 .983 .06* .019** .023** 568
(13.5) (14.2) (11.7)
Land Cultivated (Acres) 2.79 3.15 2.81 .563 .421 .259 .858 560
(3.34) (4.02) (2.98)
Own Cow(s) .761 .808 .803 .22 .209 .952 .452 566
(.427) (.394) (.398)
Portion of Income from Cane 3.30 3.38 3.23 .503 .817 .103 .274 567
(1.09) (1.09) (1.18)
Savings for Sh1,000 .284 .279 .333 .936 .273 .362 .207 564
(.452) (.450) (.472)
Savings for Sh5,000 .089 .139 .130 .198 .345 .829 .559 563
(.286) (.347) (.338)
Expected Yield 72.5 70.5 66.8 .674 .522 .577 .543 571
(100.) (31.1) (49.4)
Expected Yield in Good Year 83.5 85.5 83.1 .844 .852 .944 .88 570
(47.8) (30.8) (56.0)
Expected Yield in Bad Year 53.4 54.0 52.3 .958 .889 .972 .916 569
(40.6) (21.6) (47.2)
Good Relationship with Company .362 .341 .300 .821 .357 .933 .553 568
(.482) (.475) (.459)
Trust Company Field Assistants 3.02 2.83 2.80 .163 .11 .877 .347 567
(1.01) (1.01) (1.09)
Trust Company Managers 2.46 2.34 2.44 .319 .999 .513 .678 565
(1.11) (1.05) (1.12)
Notes: The table presents the baseline balance for the Main Experiment. Previous Yield is measured as
tons of cane per hectare harvested in the cycle before the intervention. Man is a binary indicator equal
to one if the person in charge of the sugarcane plot is male. Own Cow(s) is a binary indicator equal to
one if the household owns any cows. Portion of Income from Cane takes value between 1 (“None”) to
6 (“All”). Savings for Sh 1,000 (Sh 5,000) is a binary indicator that equals one if the respondent says
she would be able to use household savings to deal with an emergency requiring an expense of Sh 1,000
(Sh 5,000). 1 USD= 95 Sh. Good Relationship with the Company is a binary indicator that equals one
if the respondent says she has a “good” or “very good” relationship with the company (as opposed to
“bad” or “very bad”). Trust Company Field Assistants and Trust Company Managers are defined on a
scale 1 (“Not at all”) to 4 (“Completely”). P-values are based on specifications which include field fixed
effects (since randomization was stratified at the field level). *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 2—: Main Experiment: Treatment Effects on Take-Up
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
30% Discount 0.013 0.004 0.013 0.008 0.020
[0.032] [0.033] [0.033] [0.032] [0.033]
Pay At Harvest 0.670∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗
[0.032] [0.033] [0.028] [0.033] [0.032] [0.032]
Field FE N Y Y Y Y Y
Plot Controls N N N Y N Y
Farmer Controls N N N N Y Y
Mean Y Control 0.046 0.046 0.052 0.046 0.046 0.046
Observations 605 605 605 605 605 605
Notes: The table presents the results of the Main Experiment. The dependent variable is a binary
indicator equal to one if the farmer took-up the insurance. Specification (3) bundles together treatment
groups U1 (Pay Upfront) and U2 (Pay Upfront with 30% discount) as baseline group. Plot Controls
are Plot Size and Previous Yield. Farmer Controls are all of the other controls reported in the balance
table, Table 1. Stratification occurred at the field level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 3—: Main Experiment: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Wealth and Liquidity Constraints Proxies
X = Land Cultivated Own Cow(s) Previous Yield Plot Size Portion of Income Savings for Savings for
(standardized) (standardized) (standardized) from Cane Sh1,000 Sh5,000
X * Pay At Harvest -0.065∗∗ -0.141∗ -0.079∗∗ -0.001 0.052∗ -0.175∗∗ -0.131
[0.033] [0.079] [0.031] [0.031] [0.028] [0.069] [0.097]
X -0.000 0.070 0.015 -0.022 -0.004 0.008 -0.016
[0.017] [0.045] [0.020] [0.019] [0.017] [0.043] [0.059]
Pay At Harvest 0.705∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗
[0.029] [0.069] [0.028] [0.028] [0.096] [0.035] [0.031]
Mean Y Control 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052
Mean X 0 0.792 0 0 3.309 0.300 0.121
S.D. X 1 0.407 1 1 1.126 0.459 0.326
Observations 560 566 605 605 567 564 563
Notes: The table shows heterogenous treatment effects on take-up from the Main Experiment, by different proxies for liquidity constraints. The
dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the farmer took-up the insurance, and in each column the relevant heterogeneity variable (X) is
reported in the column title. Treatments U1 (Pay Upfront) and U2 (Pay Upfront with 30% discount) are bundled together as baseline group, as specified
in the pre-analysis plan. Land cultivated is the standardized total area of land cultivated by the household. Own Cow(s) is a binary indicator for whether
the household owns any cows. Previous Yield is the standardized tons of cane per hectare harvested in the cycle before the intervention. Plot size is the
standardized area of the sugarcane plot. Portion of Income from Cane takes value between 1 (“None”) to 6 (“All”). Savings for Sh 1,000 (Sh 5,000) is
a binary indicator that equals one if the respondent says she would be able to use household savings to deal with an emergency requiring an expense of
Sh 1,000 (Sh 5,000). 1 USD = 95 Sh. All columns include field fixed effects. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 4—: Cash Constraints Experiment: Treatment Effects on Take-Up
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pay At Harvest 0.593∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗
[0.074] [0.077] [0.078] [0.100] [0.105] [0.107]
Cash 0.167∗∗ 0.132∗ 0.128 0.208∗∗ 0.167 0.177
[0.074] [0.079] [0.079] [0.102] [0.110] [0.111]
Pay At Harvest * Cash -0.086 -0.071 -0.100
[0.148] [0.156] [0.159]
Field FE N Y Y N Y Y
Plot Controls N N Y N N Y
Mean Y Control 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125
P-value: Deductible = Cash 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120
Notes: The table presents the results of the Liquidity Constraints Experiment. The dependent variable
is a binary indicator equal to one if the farmer took-up the insurance. The baseline (omitted) group
is the Pay Upfront group, where farmers had to pay the premium upfront and did not receive a cash
drop. Plot Controls are Plot Size and Previous Yield. Stratification occurred at the field level. *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 5—: Intertemporal Preferences Experiment: Treatment Effects on Take-Up
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Receive Choice in One Month 0.213∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗
[0.087] [0.090] [0.092] [0.109] [0.111]
Field FE N Y Y Y Y
Plot Controls N N Y N Y
Farmer Controls N N N Y Y
Mean Y Control 0.508 0.508 0.508 0.508 0.508
Observations 120 120 120 120 120
Notes: The table presents the results of the Present Bias Experiment. The dependent variable is a
binary indicator equal to one if the farmer took-up the insurance. The baseline (omitted) group is the
Receive Now group, where farmers chose between an amount of money equal to the premium and free
subscription to the insurance. In the Receive Choice in One Month group, farmers made the same
choice, but were told that what chose would be delivered one month later (plus one month’s interest if
they chose cash). Plot Controls are Plot Size and Previous Yield. Farmer Controls are all the other
controls reported in the main balance table, Table 1. Stratification occurred at the field level. *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
5
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Table 6—: Main Experiment: Take-Up by Harvest Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
H 0.675∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ -0.054 0.719∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.096 0.707∗∗∗
[0.033] [0.054] [0.109] [0.407] [0.046] [0.028] [0.047] [0.092] [0.358] [0.040]
U2 0.004 0.012 -0.001 -0.316 0.026
[0.033] [0.055] [0.109] [0.408] [0.047]
H*Share Harvested in Field -0.046 -0.037
[0.103] [0.089]
H*Share Harvested in Subloc 0.207 0.202
[0.238] [0.202]
H*PAST Share Harvested in Subloc 0.869∗ 0.687
[0.484] [0.425]
H*Plot Harvested -0.096 -0.072
[0.070] [0.060]
U2*Share Harvested in Field -0.018
[0.101]
U2*Share Harvested in Subloc 0.010
[0.240]
U2*PAST Share Harvested in Subloc 0.382
[0.484]
U2*Plot Harvested -0.048
[0.071]
Plot Harvested 0.039 0.015
[0.057] [0.044]
Field FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Mean Y Control 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046
Observations 603 603 603 603 603 603 603 603 603 603
Notes: This table presents take-up during the experiment by subsequent harvesting behavior approximately twelve months later. The dependent
variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the farmer took-up the insurance. H is a binary indicator for the Pay At Harvest treatment group.
U2 is a binary indicator for the Pay Upfront with 30% discount treatment group. Share harvested in Field is the proportion of farmers in the Field
(an administrative, geographic unit) who harvest with the company. Share harvested in Subloc is the proportion of farmers in the Sublocation (a
geographic identifier which is coarser than Field) who harvest with the company. PAST Share harvested in Subloc is the same variable, but instead
covering the time period 2011-14, before the experiment, when side-selling was lower. Plot harvested is a binary indicator for whether the farmer
harvests his plot with the company. Specifications (6)-(10) bundle groups treatments U1 (Upfront Premium at full price) and U2 (Upfront Premium
at 30% discount) as baseline group. Regressions contain field fixed effects and are clustered at the field level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 7—: U.S. Federal Crop Insurance Regression Table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post 2012*Treatment -0.039∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.094) (0.021)
Post 2012*Treatment*IHS(AvgPlotSize) 0.047∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016)
Post 2012*Treatment*(AvgPlotSize > Median) 0.043∗∗ 0.043∗∗
(0.017) (0.017)
R2 0.265 0.312 0.317 0.297 0.302
Dependent Variable Mean 5.771 5.771 5.771 5.771 5.771
County*Crop FE Y Y Y Y Y
State*Year FE Y Y N Y N
Crop*Year FE Y Y N Y N
State*Crop Trend Y Y N Y N
State*Crop Trend * Size N Y Y Y Y
State*Crop*Year FE N N Y N Y
Observations 10753 10753 10753 10753 10753
Notes: The table presents the affect of the change in the premium billing date for U.S. Federal Crop
Insurance on insurance adoption. Data are at the county-crop-year level. The dependent variable is
the inverse hyperbolic sine (≈ log(2) + log(x)) of the number of policies sold in the county-crop-year.73
Treatment is a binary indicator equal to one if the billing date for the county-crop is earlier than the
harvesting period from 2012 onward. AvgPlotSize is the average plot size in the county. Column (1)
shows the basic difference-in-differences by state-crop (Equation (15) in the paper). Columns (2)-(5)
show the heterogeneity by average plot size in the county-crop (Equation (16) in the paper). Columns
(2)-(3) present heterogeneity by the inverse hyperbolic sign of the average plot size in the county-crop.
Columns (3)-(4) present heterogeneity by a binary indicator that is equal to one if the average plot size in
the county-crop is above the median in the state-crop. Standard errors clustered by crop-state. *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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A. Appendix
A1. Bounding the effect of the transfer across time
Households are both consumers and producers. The implications of this dual
role have long been considered in development economics. In particular, in the
presence of market frictions, separation may no longer hold, so that production
and consumption decisions can no longer be considered separately (Rosenzweig
and Wolpin 1993; Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas 1998). Above we considered
the household’s full dynamic problem, which incorporates discount factors and
stochastic consumption paths. Often, however, we can apply a sufficient-statistic
style approach, where we rely on observed behavior to tell us what we need to
know, without having to estimate all of the parameters of the full optimization
problem. In the case of intertemporal decisions, an individual’s investment be-
havior, and in particular the interest rates of investments they do and do not
make, can serve this role.
In this section we consider what observed investment behavior can tell us about
hypothetical insurance take-up decisions, given the intertemporal transfer in in-
surance. Empirically, investment decisions may be easier to observe than discount
factors and beliefs about consumption distributions (which are needed if we con-
sider the full dynamic problem), and other studies provide evidence on interest
rates in similar settings - both for investments made and for investments forgone.
Using a simplified version of the model developed above, we consider under which
conditions farmers would and would not take up insurance, given information on
their other investment behavior.
To simplify, we now assume that at harvest time there are just two states of the
world, the standard state h and the low state l, with the low state happening with
probability p.74 We assume that insurance is perfect - it only pays out in the low
state (at time H), and that it is again actuarially fair. To simplify notation, in
this section we denote by R the interest rate on the insurance covering the whole
period from the purchase decision until harvest time. We also assume CRRA
utility, so that u(c) = c1−γ/(1− γ).
Under this setup, the expected net benefit of a marginal unit of standard,
upfront insurance is:
βδHRE[cH(yl)−γ ]− c−γ0
Consider first the case that the farmer forgoes a risk-free investment over the
74Note that the following can be easily generalized so that these two states represent average outcomes
when insurance does not and does pay out respectively.
62
same time period which has rate of return R′. Then, first we know that paying
upfront is at least as costly as a price increase in pay-at-harvest insurance of R
′
R ,
and second we know that:
βδHR′(pE[cH(yl)−γ ] + (1− p)E[cH(yh)−γ ])− c−γ0 < 0
Substituting this into the expected benefit of upfront insurance, we can deduce
that farmers will not purchase standard insurance if:
RE[cH(yl)−γ ] < R′(pE[cH(yl)−γ ] + (1− p)E[cH(yh)−γ ])
⇔ E[cH(yl)
−γ ]
E[cH(yh)−γ ]
<
1− p
R
R′ − p
So, the farmer will not purchase insurance if under all consumption paths:
cH(yh) < AcH(yl)
with A given by:
A =
(
1− p
R
R′ − p
) 1γ
Unsurprisingly, A is increasing in the (relative) forgone interest rate R/R′, and
decreasing in the CRRA γ. Also, A is increasing in the probability of the low state,
p, suggesting that the intertemporal transfer is less of a constraint on insuring
rarer events.
Similarly, we can consider the case where the farmer makes an investment over
the period with risk-free interest rate R′. Under the same logic, we first know
that a price raise of pay-at-harvest insurance of R
′
R is at least as costly as paying
upfront, and second we also know the farmer will purchase insurance if, for all
consumption paths:
cH(yh) > AcH(yl)
The following tables report A for various values of R′/R, p, and γ. The tables
thus reports how much consumption must vary between good and bad harvests
in order to be sure about farmers’ decisions to buy perfect insurance, given their
investment decisions. In the case of forgone investments, it tells us the largest
variation in consumption for which we can be sure that the farmer will still not
buy perfect insurance; in the case of made investments, it tells us the smallest
variation in consumption for which we can be sure that the farmer will buy perfect
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insurance. We note that A represents variation in consumption between states at
harvest time - not variation in income, which is likely to be significantly larger.
The effect can be sizeable. For example, for a risk which has a 20% chance of
occurring, if the forgone investment has risk-free rate of return 50% higher than
the interest rate charged on the insurance, then farmers with CRRA of 1 will
forgo a perfect insurance product even when the consumption in the good state
is 71.4% higher than consumption in the bad state.
γ = 1
p
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.4
R′
R
1 1 1 1 1 1
1.1 1.101 1.106 1.112 1.128 1.179
1.2 1.202 1.213 1.227 1.263 1.385
1.5 1.508 1.541 1.588 1.714 2.250
2 2.020 2.111 2.250 2.667 6.000
3 3.062 3.353 3.857 6.000 ∞
γ = 2
p
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.4
R′
R
1 1 1 1 1 1
1.1 1.049 1.052 1.055 1.062 1.086
1.2 1.097 1.101 1.108 1.124 1.177
1.5 1.228 1.241 1.260 1.309 1.500
2 1.421 1.453 1.500 1.633 2.449
3 1.750 1.831 1.964 2.449 ∞
γ = 5
p
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.4
R′
R
1 1 1 1 1 1
1.1 1.019 1.020 1.022 1.024 1.033
1.2 1.038 1.039 1.042 1.048 1.067
1.5 1.086 1.090 1.097 1.114 1.176
2 1.151 1.161 1.176 1.217 1.431
3 1.251 1.274 1.310 1.431 ∞
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A2. Supply of insurance
While the farmer is better off with the pay-at-harvest insurance, strategic de-
fault means that the insurer may be worse off. Suppose the insurer could set
the price of the insurance, p. Under pay-at-harvest insurance at price p, their
expected profit conditional on them not defaulting themselves is:
Expected profit for insurer = E[(p− I)Dp(p)]
= P[Dp(p) = 1]E[p− I|p− I ≤ cD
u′(cH)
]
This makes it clear that imperfect enforcement may prevent pay-at-harvest in-
surance from being offered when cD is small, since strategic default means the
insurer never makes a profit, even as he increases price. This is likely the reason
why pay-at-harvest insurance is not offered more often. However, charging the
premium upfront places all of the risk of default on the farmer, and as we have
seen may also activate liquidity constraints.
When cD > 0, which timing of premium payment would prevail in equilibrium
is not clear-cut. Intuitively, the risk of insurer default pushes towards pay-at-
harvest, whereas the risk of farmer default pushes towards upfront. To the extent
that insurer risk is not subject to moral hazard or adverse selection, for example if
it is caused by stochastic shocks which occur after take-up, then it may be priced
in to the insurance, suggesting upfront may be optimal. But liquidity constraints,
as well as the second order effects (not modelled here) of exposing the farmer to
risk over whether the insurer will default, push the other way, as does moral
hazard on the insurer and adverse selection over insurance companies which are
likely to default.
To demonstrate simply how the different forces push towards upfront or at-
harvest contracts, we consider the above setup, and assume that insurers know
ex-ante whether they will default or not, so are of two types: proportion 1 − pI
who never default, and proportion pI who always default before harvest. Further
assume that the farmer cannot tell ex-ante which type he faces. Under this setup,
we allow the price p of the insurance to vary, and consider under which conditions
a price p could exist under which trade would occur.
For pay-upfront insurance, this requires
pR−Hu′(c0) ≤ βδH(1− pI)E[Iu′(cH)]
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and75
p ≥ 1
For pay-at-harvest insurance, it requires
E[Dp(p)pu′(cH) + (1−DP (p))cD] ≤ E[Dp(p)Iu′(cH)]
and
E[p− I|p− I ≤ cD
u′(cH)
] ≥ 0
where Dp(p) = I[p − I ≤ cDu′(cH) ]. Given these conditions, the following follows
easily
PROPOSITION 6:
Pay-at-harvest insurance ∃cD > 0 for which there is no price at which pay-
at-harvest insurance would be traded when the cost of default cD(s) < cD ∀s.
However, if cD > maxs u
′(cH(s)) ∀s, then deductible insurance could be traded at
price 1.
Pay-upfront insurance ∃pI < 1 such that if pI > pI , there is no price at which
pay-upfront insurance would be traded.
This proposition shows that the cost of strategic default for the insured, cD,
and the probability of the insurer defaulting, pI , are key considerations for which
insurance products could be exist in equilibrium (and if so how much insurance
they could provide). The cost of strategic default is similarly found to be impor-
tant in a literature discussing another type of purely cross-state insurance: risk
sharing (Ligon, Thomas and Worrall 2002; Kocherlakota 1996). The literature
considers both how cD is made large enough for informal risk sharing to exist,
typically through relational contracting and punishment mechanisms, and how
the size of cD dictates the extent of risk sharing which can be achieved. Related
to the discussion here, Gauthier, Poitevin and Gonzalez (1997) consider how en-
larging the contracting space in risk sharing, so as to allow for ex-ante transfers,
enlarges the set of parameters for which the first-best outcome is achievable.
75If p < 1 the defaulting insurers would still offer insurance, but the farmers would know that only
defaulting insurers were offering insurance, and hence would not take it up.
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A3. Proofs and derivations
Background
States Each period t, which we will typically think of as one month, has a
set of states St, corresponding to different income realizations. The probability
distribution over states is assumed to be memoryless, so that P (st = s) may
depend on t, but is independent of the history at time t, (si)i<t. We assume that
the probability distribution of outcomes is cyclical, of period N, so that St = St+N
and P (st = s) = P (st+N = s) ∀t, s.
Dynamic programming problem
Vt(xt), the time t self’s value function, is the solution to the following recursive
dynamic programming problem:
(A.1) Vt(xt) = max
ct
u(ct) + βδEs[V ct+1(xt+1)]
subject to, for all i ≥ 0, xt+i+1 = R(xt+i − ct+i) + yt+i+1
xt+i − ct+i ≥ 0
where V ct (xt), the continuation value function, is the solution to equation A.1,
but with β = 1, i.e.
(A.2) V ct (xt) = maxct
u(ct) + δEs[V ct+1(xt+1)]
Because of the cyclicality of the setup, the functions Vt(.) = Vt+N (.) and V
c
t (.) =
V ct+N (.) ∀t.
Proof of Lemma 1
Part (1). — Since V c is the solution to a recursive dynamic programming
problem with convex flow payoffs, concave intertemporal technology, and convex
choice space, theorem 9.6 and 9.8 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) tell us that V c
exists and is strictly concave. To expand further, the proofs, which are similar in
method to subsequent proofs below, are as follows.
Existence & Uniqueness. Blackwell’s sufficient conditions hold for the Bell-
man operator mapping V ct+1 to V
c
t : monotinicity is clear; discounting follows by
the assumption that δR < 1 - taking a ∈ R, V ct+1 +a is mapped to V ct+1 +δRa; the
flow payoff (u(ct)) is bounded and continous by assumption; compactness of the
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state-space is problematic, but given δR < 1 the stock of cash-on-hand will not
amass indefinitely, so we can bound the state space with little concern (Stokey
and Lucas (1989) provide more formal, technical methods to deal with the prob-
lem. Since it is not the focus of the paper, we do not go into more details.).
Thus, the Bellman operator is a contraction mapping, and iterating this operator
implies the mapping from V ct+N to V
c
t is a contraction mapping also. V
c
t is a fixed
point of this mapping, and thus exists and is unique by the contraction mapping
theorem.
Concavity. Assume V ct+N is concave. Then, V
c
t+N−1 is strictly concave, since
the utility function is concave and the state space correspondence in convex, by
standard argument (take xθ = θxa + (1 − θ)xb, expand out the definition of
V ct+N−1(xθ) and use the concavity of V
c
t+N−1 and the strict concavity of u(.)).
Iterating this argument, we thus have that V ct is concave. Therefore, since there
is a unique fixed point of the contraction mapping from V ct+N to V
c
t , that fixed
point must be concave (since we will converge to the fixed point by iterating from
any starting function; start from a concave function).
Part (2) . —
Vt(xt) = maxc u(c) + βδE[V ct+1(R(xt − c) + yt+1)]
Since V ct+1 is concave, this is a convex problem, and the solution satisfies:
u′(ct) = max{βδRE[V c′t+1(R(xt − ct) + yt+1)], u′(xt)}
Define a(xt) = xt − c(xt). Take x′t > xt, and suppose a′t(x′t) < at(xt). Since
a′t ≥ 0, we must have at > 0. Now, a′t < at implies c′t > ct, so u′(c′t) < u′(ct) =
βδRE[V c′(Rat+y)] ≤ βδRE[V c′(Ra′t+y)] ≤ u′(c′t). Contradiction. Thus a′t(xt) ≥
0. Since V c
′
(Rat + yt+1) = u
′(ct+1), the concavity of V c also implies that ct+1 is
increasing in xt in the sense of first order stochastic dominance.
Part (3). — The proof relies on showing that the mapping from V c
′
t+1 to
V c
′
t conserves convexity, ∀t ∈ R+. Then the proof follows as in 1 above: V ct is
the fixed point of a contraction mapping which conserves convexity of the first
derivative, hence V c
′
t must be convex. We provide two methods to show that the
mapping preserves convexity, the first of which is based on Deaton and Laroque
(1992), and the second of which assumes V c
′′′
t exists and gives more intuition for
where the convexity is coming from.
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Version 1. — Suppose V c
′
t+1 is convex.
V c
′
t (xt) = u
′(ct)
= max{δRE[V c′t+1(R(xt − ct) + yt+1)], u′(xt)}
Define G by G(q, x) = δRE[V c′t+1(R(xt − u′−1(q) + yt+1)].
G is convex in q and x : u′ is convex and strictly decreasing, so u′−1 is convex
(and so −u′−1 is concave); V c′t+1 is convex and decreasing, so V c
′
t+1(R(xt−u′−1(q))+
yt+1) convex in q and x (since f convex decreasing and g concave⇒ f ◦g convex);
expectation is a linear operator (and hence preserves convexity).
Now V c
′
t = max[G(V
c′
t (xt), xt), u
′(xt)], or, defining H(q, x) = max{G(q, x) −
q, u′(x)− q}, then V c′t is the solution in q of H(q, x) = 0.
H is convex in q and x, since it is the max of two functions, each of which are
convex in q and x. Take any two x and x′ and λ ∈ (0, 1). Then H(V c′t (x), x) =
H(V c
′
t (x
′), x′) = 0. Thus, by the convexity of H, H(λV c′t (x)+(1−λ)V c
′
t (x
′), λx+
(1 − λ)x′) ≤ 0. Now, since H is decreasing in q, that means that V c′t (λx + (1 −
λ)x′) < λV c′t (x) + (1− λ)V c
′
t (x
′), i.e. V c′t is convex.
Version 2. — Suppose V c
′
t+1 is convex.
V ct (xt) = maxc u(c) + δE[V ct+1(R(xt − c) + yt+1)]
⇒ V c′t (xt) = δREV c
′
t+1(xt+1) + c
′
t(xt)µt
⇒ V c′′t (xt) = δR2EV c
′′
t+1(1− c′t(xt)) + c′′t (xt)µt + c′t(xt)µ′t
⇒ V c′′′t (xt) = δR3EV c
′′′
t+1(1− c′t(xt))2 − δR2EV c
′′
t+1c
′′
t (xt) + c
′′′
t (xt)µt + 2c
′′
t (xt)µ
′
t + c
′
t(xt)µ
′′
t
Now, the first order condition is
u′(ct) = βδREV c
′
t+1(xt+1) + µt
Consider first the case where µt > 0. Then c(xt) = xt and v
c′
t (xt) = u
′(c(xt)). So
vc
′
t (xt) = u
′(xt) thus vc
′′′
t (xt) = u
′′′(xt) > 0.
So, assume µ = 0. Differentiating the FOC wrt x gives
u′′(c(xt))c′(xt) = βδR2EV c
′′
t+1(1− c′(xt))
⇒ c′(xt) =
βδR2EV c′′t+1(xt)
βδR2EV c′′t+1(xt) + u′′(c(xt))
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Differentiating again with respect to w gives
c′′(xt) =
(βδR3EV c′′′t+1(1− c′))(βδR2EV c
′′
t+1 + u
′′)− (βδR2EV c′′t+1)(βδR3EV c
′′′
t+1(1− c′) + u′′′c′)
(βδR2EV c′′+ + u′′)2
=
u′′βδR3EV c′′′t+1(1− c′)− u′′′c′βδR2EV c
′′
t+1
(βδR2EV c′′t+1 + u′′)2
Substituting in to the equation for V c
′′′
gives:
V c
′′′
t (xt) = δR
3EV c
′′′
+ (
u′′
βδR2EV c′′t+1 + u′′
)2 − δR2EV c′′t+1
u′′βδR3EV c′′′t+1(1− c′)− u′′′c′βδR2EV c
′′
t+1
(βδR2EV c′′t+1 + u′′)2
=
u′′2δR3EV c′′′t+1(βδR2EV c
′′
t+1 + u
′′)− βδ2R5u′′2EV c′′t+1EV c
′′′
t+1
(βδR2EV c′′t+1 + u′′)3
+
βδ2R4u′′′c′(EV c′′t+1)2(βδR2EV c
′′
t+1 + u
′′)
(βδR2EV c′′t+1 + u′′)3
=
u′′3δR3EV c′′′t+1
(βδR2EV c′′t+1 + u′′)3
+
βδ2R4u′′′c′(EV c′′t+1)2
(βδR2EV c′′t+1 + u′′)2
≥ 0
Insurance with perfect enforcement
Proof of Propostion 1
In the following, denote by at the assets held at the end of period t, so that
at = xt − ct.
Suppose farmers have zero probability of being liquidity constrained before
the next harvest, when they buy pay-upfront insurance. Denote their (state-
dependent) path of assets until harvest by (aut )t<H , given that they have pur-
chased pay-upfront insurance. By the assumption that the farmers will not be
liquidity constrained before harvest, aUt > 0 ∀t < H and for all histories (si)i≤t.
Now, suppose instead of pay-upfront insurance, they had been offered pay-at-
harvest insurance. If they invest the money they would have spent on pay-upfront
insurance in assets instead, so aHt (s) = a
U
t (s) + R
−H−t, then they can pay the
pay-at-harvest premium at harvest time and have the same consumption path as
in the case of pay-upfront, so they must be at least as well off. Similarly, sup-
pose they optimally hold (aDt )t<H in the pay-at-harvest case. If instead offered
upfront insurance, they can use some of these assets to instead buy insurance, so
that aUt (s) = a
D
t (s)−R−H−t. Since, by assumption aUt (s) > 0, doing so they can
again follow the same consumption path as in the case of pay-at-harvest insur-
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ance, so pay-upfront insurance is at least as good as at-harvest insurance. Thus
the farmer is indifferent between pay-upfront and pay-at-harvest insurance.
To first order, at time 0 the net benefit of pay-at-harvest insurance is βδHE(Iu′(cH))−
βδHE(u′(cH)), and of pay-upfront is βδHE(Iu′(cH)) − βδHE(u′(cH)) − R−HλH0
(note that the envelope theorem applies because, in the sequence problem, the
insurance payout I does not enter any constraints before time H. This would no
longer be the case if borrowing constraints were endogenous to next period’s in-
come). Thus the difference between the two is R−HλH0 . Consider a pay-upfront
insurance product which had premium (1− λH0u′(c0))R−H . The net benefit would be
βδHE(Iu′(cH))− (1− λ
H
0
u′(c0)
)R−Hu′(c0)
=βδHE(Iu′(cH))− (u′(c0)− λH0 )R−H
=βδHE(Iu′(cH))− βδHE(u′(cH))
This is the net benefit of pay-at-harvest insurance.
Proof of Propostion 2
The value of the pay-at-harvest insurance is βδHE(V cH(wH + yH + I − 1)) −
βδHE(V cH(wH + yH)). How this changes wrt x0 is given by:
d
dx0
[βδHE(V cH(wH + yH + I − 1))− βδHE(V cH(wH + yH))]
=
dwH
dx0
βδH [E(V c
′
H (wH + yH + I − 1))− E(V c
′
H (wH + yH))]
Now, dwHdx0 ≥ 0, by iterating lemma 1 back from period H to period 0. Also,
yH + I − 1 strictly second order stochastic dominates yH by assumption, and V c′H
is strictly convex (V c
′′′
> 0 by lemma 1), so E(V c′H (wH+yH+I−1))−E(V c
′
H (wH+
yH)) < 0. Thus, the value of pay-at-harvest insurance is decreasing with wealth.
Now, the reduction in net utility from insurance arising from upfront premium
payment is R−HλH0 , by proposition 1. By lemma 1, this is also decreasing in
wealth.
If the farmer is certain to be liquidity constrained before the next harvest,
when starting with x0, then his wealth at the start of the next harvest wH will
be the same as if he started with x′0, for any x′0 < x0. This is because wealth
in the next period is decreasing in wealth this period, so by the time the farmer
has exhausted his wealth starting at x0, he will also have exhausted his wealth
starting at x′0. Now, since the income process is memoryless, once the agent has
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exhausted his wealth, his distribution of wealth at the next harvest is the same,
irrespective of his history. Thus the farmer has the same value of deductible
insurance, regardless of whether he starts with x0 or x
′
0, but the extra cost of the
intertemporal transfer in the upfront insurance starting from x′0 means that the
farmer has a lower value of upfront insurance.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is essentially the same as that of the second half of proposition 1.
Insurance with imperfect enforcement
Outside option o(sH , wH)
If the farmer chooses to sell to the company he receives profits y(s) (comprising
revenues minus a deduction for inputs provided on credit) plus any insurance
payout I(s), minus the insurance premium in the case of pay-at-harvest insurance.
He also receives continuation value rC(s) from the relationship with the company,
which is possibly state dependent. If he chooses to side sell, he receives outside
option o(s) 76, and saves the deductions for inputs provided on credit and for the
deductible insurance premium, but loses the continuation value and any insurance
payout. We abstract from any impact of insurance on the choice of input supply,
since, as argued before, the choice set is limited, the double trigger design of the
insurance was chosen to minimize moral hazard, and, as reported below, we see
no evidence of moral hazard in the experimental data.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the decisions to sell to the company (i.e. not to side-sell). Denote
the indicator functions for these decisions by D, with a subscript representing
whether or not the insurer has already defaulted on the insurance contract, and
a supercript denoting whether the farmer holds insurance, and if so the type of
the insurace.
If the insurer has not already defaulted, they are:
DI =I[cD ≥ 0] without insurance
DUI =I[(1− ps2)Iu′(cH) + cD ≥ 0] with pay-upfront insurance
DDI =I[(1− ps2)Iu′(cH) + cD ≥ u′(cH)] with pay-at-harvest insurance
76We don’t have detailed information on payments under side selling, but anecdotal evidence suggests
that side sellers pay significantly less than the contract company, so a natural assumption would be that
o(s) = αy(s), where α < 1
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If the insurer has already defaulted, they are:
DD =I[cD ≥ 0] without insurance
DUD =I[cD ≥ 0] with pay-upfront insurance
DDD =I[cD ≥ u′(cH)] with pay-at-harvest insurance
Since (1 − ps2)I(s)u′(cH(s)) and u′(cH(s)) are non-negative, and Iu′(cH) and
(I − 1)u′(cH) are larger when yields are low, the results follow.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the net benefit of insurance, which is the benefit of the payout minus
the cost of the premium payout. With perfect enforcement, we know that at-
harvest insurance is equivalent to upfront insurance with a percentage price cut
of
λH0
u′(c0) . Denote the net benefit of such an upfront insurance product by SU , and
by SD the net benefit of at-harvest insurance. Then
77:
E[SD − SU ] =(1− ps1)(ΣdD,dU∈{0,1}P[DUI = dU , DDI = dD]E[SD − SU |DUI = dU , DDI = dD])
+ ps1(ΣdD,dU∈{0,1}P[DUD = dU , DDD = dD]E[SD − SU |DUD = dU , DDD = dD])
Now, DUD ≥ DDD and DUI ≥ DDI . Also
E[SD − SU |DUI = 1, DDI = 1] = E[SD − SU |DUD = 1, DDD = 1] = 0
This leaves the cases where both default, or where pay-at-harvest defaults and
pay-upfront doesn’t. Conditional on DUI = 0, D
D
I = 0, or D
U
D = 0, D
D
D = 0, we
have
SD − SU = βδHu′(cH)
When DUI = 1, D
D
I = 0, then
SD − SU = βδH(u′(cH)− (1− ps2)Iu′(cH)− cD) ≤ βδHu′(cH)
Thus:
E[SD − SU ] ≤(1− ps1)(P[DUI = DDI = 0] + P [DUI = 1, DDI = 0])βδHE[u′(cH)|DDI = 0]
+ ps1(P[DUD = DDD = 0] + P[DUD = 1, DDD = 0])βδHE[u′(cH)|DDD = 0]
77See proof of Proposition 4 for the definitions of the D.
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with strict inequality iff P[DUI = 1, DDI = 0] > 0. The right hand side can be
rewritten to give:
⇔ E[SD − SU ] ≤(1− ps1)P[DDI = 0]βδHE[u′(cH)|DDI = 0]
+ ps1P[DDD = 0]βδHE[u′(cH)|DDD = 0]
⇔ E[SD − SU ] ≤P(side-sell with at-harvest)βδHE(u′(cH)|side-sell with at-harvest)
We compare this to the surplus effect on the net benefit of upfront insurance of a
further proportional price reduction of P(side-sell with at-harvest)E(u
′(cH)|side-sell with at-harvest)
E(u′(cH)) ,
which is:
P(side-sell with at-harvest)
E(u′(cH)|side-sell with at-harvest)
E(u′(cH))
E(u′(cH))
=P(side-sell with at-harvest)E(u′(cH)|side-sell with at-harvest)
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A4. Risk profile of the insurance
Figure A.1. : Simulation of insurance payout based on historical data
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 ----- 2012 2013
Proportion of plots with yields < 90% of predicted yield
Receive payout Do not receive payout
Notes: The diagram shows what the proportion of farmers who would have received a positive payout
from the insurance in previous years, and gives a sense of the basis risk of the insurance product. The
numbers are based on simulations using historical administrative data on yields. The total bar height
is the proportion of people who would have received an insurance payout under a single trigger design.
This is then broken into those who still receive a payout when the second, area yield based trigger added,
and those who do not. We do not have data for the years 2006-2011.
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A5. Additional experimental results
Table A.1—: Main Experiment: Heterogeneous Treatment Effect by Trust
(1) (2) (3)
Good Relationship Trust Company Trust Company
with Company Field Assistants Managers
X * Pay At Harvest -0.063 0.021 0.027
[0.070] [0.029] [0.028]
X 0.088∗∗ 0.035∗ 0.028
[0.041] [0.019] [0.017]
Pay At Harvest 0.726∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗
[0.035] [0.087] [0.073]
Mean Y Control 0.052 0.052 0.052
Mean X 0.335 2.885 2.418
S.D. X 0.472 1.045 1.099
Observations 568 567 565
Notes: The table shows heterogeneity of the treatment effect of the pay-at-harvest premium on insurance
take-up in the main experiment by different proxies for trust toward the company. The dependent variable
is a binary indicator equal to one if the farmer took-up the insurance. Treatments U1 (Upfront Payment)
and U2 (Upfront Payment with 30% discount) are bundled together as baseline group, as outlined in the
pre-analysis plan. The relevant heterogeneity variable is reported in the column title. The notes of Table
1 provide a definition of the variables used in the heterogeneity analysis. All columns include field fixed
effects. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table A.2—: Main Experiment: Heterogeneous Treatment Effect by Required Rates of Return
RRR on inputs RRR 0 to 1 week RRR 0 to 1 week
− RRR 1 to 2 weeks
X * Pay At Harvest -0.123 0.099 0.003
[0.142] [0.114] [0.153]
X 0.071 0.035 0.119
[0.082] [0.065] [0.091]
Pay At Harvest 0.760∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗
[0.054] [0.042] [0.029]
Mean Y Control 0.052 0.052 0.052
Mean X 0.326 0.270 -0.043
S.D. X 0.228 0.278 0.211
Observations 559 561 559
Notes: The table shows heterogeneity of the treatment effect of the pay-at-harvest premium on insurance
take-up in the main experiment, by preferences in Money Earlier or Later experiments. The dependent
variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the farmer took-up the insurance. Treatments U1 (Upfront
Payment) and U2 (Upfront Payment with 30% discount) are bundled together as baseline group. The
relevant heterogeneity variable is reported in the column title. These variables come from responses to
hypothetical (Becker-DeGroot) choices over earlier or later cash transfers, which give various Required
Rates of Returns. ‘RRR for inputs’ is the required rate of return which would (hypothetically) make
farmers indifferent between paying for inputs upfront and having them deducted from harvest revenues.
‘RRR 0 to 1 week’ is the required rate of return to delay receipt of a cash transfer by one week. ‘RRR 0
to 1 week - RRR 1 to 2 weeks’ is the difference between the rates of return required to delay receipt of
a cash transfer from today to one week from now, and from one week from now to two weeks from now.
All columns include field fixed effects. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
77
Table A.3—: Main Experiment: Harvest Status vs. Wealth & Liquidity Constraint Proxies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Yield 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
[0.001] [0.001]
Plot Size 0.329∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗
[0.151] [0.159]
Land Cultivated (Acres) 0.002 0.001
[0.005] [0.006]
Any Cow -0.018 -0.035
[0.052] [0.052]
Portion of Income from Cane 0.030∗ 0.012
[0.018] [0.018]
Savings for Sh1,000 0.000 -0.072
[0.048] [0.056]
Savings for Sh5,000 0.064 0.112
[0.062] [0.076]
Constant 0.190∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.042
[0.072] [0.050] [0.023] [0.045] [0.060] [0.022] [0.017] [0.109]
Field FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 603 603 559 564 565 562 561 552
Notes: This table presents ex-post harvesting behavior by proxies for wealth and liquidity constraints at
baseline. The dependent variable is whether the farmer harvested with the company, a binary indicator.
The independent variables are as described in Table 3. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table A.4—: Liquidity Constraints Experiment: Balance Table
Upfront Upfront + Cash Harvest Harvest + Cash P-value P-value
[U] [U + Cash] [H] [H + Cash] [H - U] [Cash - No cash] N
Plot Size .301 .290 .283 .282 .18 .967 120
(.107) (.092) (.121) (.088)
Previous Yield 54.3 57.8 61.4 54.1 .758 .745 120
(18.4) (17.9) (14.8) (17.0)
Notes: The table presents baseline balancing for the Liquidity Constraints Experiment. Previous Yield
is measured as tons of cane per hectare harvested in the cycle before the intervention. There are fewer
covariates for this experiment as it did not have an accompanying survey, so we only have covariates
from administrative data. P-values are based on specifications which include field fixed effects (the unit
of stratification for the randomization). *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table A.5—: Present Bias Experiment: Balance Table
Receive Now Receive in One Month p-value N
Plot Size .328 .292 .093* 120
(.109) (.105)
Yield 58.0 57.7 .512 120
(20.1) (21.5)
Man .793 .590 .009*** 119
(.408) (.495)
Age 48.3 47.7 .573 119
(12.8) (11.9)
Land Cultivated (Acres) 3.47 2.67 .067* 117
(2.92) (1.72)
Any Cow .844 .852 .987 119
(.365) (.357)
Portion of Income from Cane 3.62 3.32 .193 119
(1.12) (.943)
Savings for Sh1,000 .327 .295 .526 119
(.473) (.459)
Savings for Sh5,000 .155 .065 .056* 119
(.365) (.249)
Expected Yield 77.7 87.5 .47 119
(65.3) (38.4)
Expected Yield in Good Year 95.1 109. .322 119
(70.7) (48.4)
Expected Yield in Bad Year 63.0 69.4 .682 119
(61.7) (32.0)
Good Relationship with Company .310 .316 .622 118
(.466) (.469)
Trust Company Field Assistants 3.10 2.83 .315 119
(1.02) (1.01)
Trust Company Managers 2.15 2.11 .32 119
(1.13) (1.03)
Notes: The table presents baseline balancing for the Present Bias Experiment. Previous Yield is mea-
sured as tons of cane per hectare harvested in the cycle before the intervention. Man is a binary indicator
equal to one if the person in charge of the sugarcane plot is male. Own Cow(s) is a binary indicator equal
to one if the household owns any cows. Portion of Income from Cane takes value between 1 (“None”)
to 6 (“All”). Savings for Sh 1,000 (Sh 5,000) is a binary indicator that equals one if the respondent says
she would be able to use household savings to deal with an emergency requiring an expense of Sh 1,000
(Sh 5,000). 1 USD= 95 Sh. Good Relationship with the Company is a binary indicator that equals one
if the respondent says she has a “good” or “very good” relationship with the company (as opposed to
“bad” or “very bad”). Trust Company Field Assistants and Trust Company Managers are defined on a
scale 1 (“Not at all”) to 4 (“Completely”). P-values are based on specifications which include field fixed
effects (since randomization was stratified at the field level). *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table A.6—: U.S. Crop Insurance Robustness Regression Table
DD across states DD within states DDD
(spring vs. winter wheat) (corn vs. winter wheat)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post 2012*Treatment -0.081∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ 0.044 0.044 0.023 -0.081∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.025) (0.022) (0.015)
R2 0.075 0.095 0.147 0.182 0.132 0.190 0.254 0.265
Dependent Variable Mean 5.480 5.480 5.653 5.653 5.771 5.771 5.771 5.771
County*Crop FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N Y N Y
Crop*Year FE N Y Y Y
State*Year FE N N Y Y
State*Crop Trend N N N Y
Observations 5378 5378 8337 8337 10753 10753 10753 10753
Notes: The table provides further details for the triple difference estimates provided in Table 7 for the effect of the change in the premium
billing date for U.S. Federal Crop Insurance on insurance adoption. Columns (1)-(4) give the difference-in-differences effects which go
into the triple difference estimate and columns (5)-(8) present robustness checks for the estimate. Data are at the county-crop-year
level. The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine (≈ log(2) + log(x)) of the number of policies sold in the county-crop-year.
Treatment is a binary indicator equal to one if the billing date for the county-crop is earlier than the harvesting period from 2012 onward.
AvgPlotSize is the average plot size in the county. Columns (1) and (2) report a difference-in-differences estimate, which compares
insurance take-up for wheat across states: spring wheat states (for which the premium moved before harvest) vs. winter wheat states
(for which the premium did not move before harvest time). Columns (3) and (4) report an alternative difference-in-differences estimate,
which compares insurance take-up across crops within (winter wheat) states: corn (treated) vs winter wheat (not treated). Columns
(5)-(8) report robustness of the DDD estimate to the inclusion of fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by crop-state. *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
